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Abstract 
In the 21st century, a new way of raising funds called crowdfunding has taken off. Among the variety 
of different crowdfunding subcategories, equity-based crowdfunding has gained popularity, as 
regulators have opened up the market. While the money is flowing into the campaigns in increasing 
amounts, a phenomenon called overfunding has become more pronounced. This paper adds 
perspective to the drivers of overfunding in equity crowdfunding while also looking at the crowd’s 
decision-making process affecting the phenomena. The study follows previous research made by 
Koch (2016) in the reward-based context and the work of Herbert Simon (1947), and Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974) in the behavioral finance literature. Explorative and quantitative research methods 
are used jointly to study the progress of overfunding due to the lack of comprehensive previous 
studies. 
Invesdor Oy, a dominant player among the equity crowdfunding platforms in the Nordics 
(Lukkarinen et al., 2016: 6), provides the data for this report. The information encompasses 185 
projects from the opening of the platform in 2012 up till September 2017. The platform operates on 
an ‘all or nothing’ model where the money returns for the investor if the campaign does not reach 
the initial funding target. However, the campaigns can exceed the initial target by large margins as 
projects can continue to receive contributions until the deadline. Consequently, the maximum 
amount sought can differ extensively from the original goal. A ratio of finally reached funding X and 
the initially defined funding goal Xgoal measures the overfunding phenomena. 
Studying campaign conditions, information disclosure, external context and project segmentation, 
the study demonstrates that duration, forum posts and external investments are associated with 
overfunding in equity crowdfunding. The shorter the campaign duration, more pronounced is 
overfunding. The finding diverges from the earlier overfunding study made by Koch (2016) in the 
reward-based crowdfunding setting. In addition, the more forum posts and external investments 
from angel investors the campaign gets, the stronger is overfunding. The finding is similar to earlier 
reports on overfunding (Koch, 2016; Virtala, 2017) which have examined the effects of 
communication and external help to campaign success. Percentage-wise, overfunding seems to be a 
more pronounced phenomenon in equity- than reward-based crowdfunding. Furthermore, the 
explorative research design suggests that especially present heuristic, herding behavior, anchoring, 
collective conservatism, satisficing and vividness will affect the overfunding phenomena. 
In addition, the study has implications for practitioners. With closely the same amount of effort and 
resources, small enterprises could exceed their funding targets and eventually accelerate their 
growth story. Moreover, regulators and platform operators should take into consideration the 
possible drawbacks of the crowd’s heuristics and deliberate spreading of misinformation: some 
stakeholders could use them as their own advantage without thinking the potential harm for the 
whole community.  
Keywords  equity crowdfunding, behavioral finance, overfunding, bounded rationality, human 
heuristics 
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Tiivistelmä 
Joukkorahoituksen käyttö rahoitustapana on lisääntynyt 2010-luvulla. Lainsäädännössä 
tapahtuneet muutokset ovat mahdollistaneet osakepohjaisen joukkorahoituksen käyttämisen 
muiden joukkorahoitusmuotojen ohella. Samalla kuitenkin kun kampanjat keräävät entistä 
enemmän rahoitusta, myös projektien ylimerkinnät ovat yleistyneet. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään 
mitkä kampanjoiden taustatekijät selittävät ylirahoitusta. Tämän analyysin lisäksi tutkimuksessa 
esitellään ihmisten käyttäytymismalleja, jotka voivat vaikuttaa ylirahoitukseen. Tutkimus jatkaa 
aikaisempaa Kochin (2016) kehittämää mallia ylirahoituksesta sekä ottaa vaikutteita 
behavioristisen tiedekunnan tekemistä havainnoista (Simon, 1947; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). 
Aikaisempien tutkimustulosten niukkuudesta johtuen tutkielmassa käytetään sekä exploratiivista 
että kvantitatiivista tutkimusotetta.  
Tutkimuksen aineiston on kerännyt Invesdor Oy, joka on yksi Pohjois-Euroopan johtavista 
osakepohjaisista joukkorahoitusalustoista (Lukkarinen et al., 2016: 6). Aineisto koostuu 185 
kampanjasta, jotka ajoittuvat vuosien 2012 ja 2017 välille. Invesdor toimii ’kaikki tai ei mitään’ -
mallilla, jossa rahat palautetaan sijoittajalle, mikäli projekti ei saavuta alussa asettamaansa 
rahoitustavoitetta. Kampanjat voivat kuitenkin ylittää tavoitteen merkittävästi, sillä 
maksimirahoitusmäärä voi poiketa selvästi alun päämäärästä. Tutkielman mittarina käytetään 
kampanjan lopussa saavutettua rahoitusta X verrattuna alun tavoitteeseen Xmaali, joka määrittää 
projektin onnistuneisuuden.  
Tutkielma osoittaa, että tärkeitä tekijöitä kampanjan ylirahoittamisessa ovat hankkeen kesto, 
kampanjan sivuilla käyty keskustelun määrä sekä ulkopuolisten rahoittajien tekemät sijoitukset. 
Lyhyempi hankkeen kesto on yhteydessä ylimerkitsemiseen. Tämä havainto eroaa Kochin (2016) 
aikaisemmasta tutkimuksesta. Lisäksi lisääntynyt keskustelu kampanjasivuilla sekä ulkopuoliset 
sijoitukset enkelisijoittajilta tai perheeltä tukevat ylirahoitusta. Tämä on linjassa aikaisempien 
ylirahoitustutkimusten kanssa (Koch, 2016; Virtala, 2017). Prosentuaalisesti näyttää siltä, että 
merkittäviä ylirahoituskampanjoita on enemmän osakepohjaisissa kampanjoissa kuin muissa 
joukkorahoitussegmenteissä, kun tuloksia verrataan aikaisempiin tutkimuksiin. Lisäksi 
käyttäytymisteoriaan nojaten tulkitaan, että useampi ihmisiin vaikuttava heuristinen reaktio 
vaikuttaa ylimerkitsemisilmiöön. 
Pro gradu -työ lisää tietoisuutta ylimerkitsemisilmiöstä sekä yhdistää aiheen ihmisten 
käyttäytymistieteeseen sekä päätöksentekoprosessiin. Tutkielman tulokset voivat hyödyttää myös 
ammatinharjoittajia ja päätöksentekijöitä. Yritysten omistajat voivat saada liiketoiminnalleen 
enemmän rahoitusta lähes samalla työpanoksella. Lainsäätäjiä sekä joukkorahoitusalustojen 
käyttäjiä tulokset muistuttavat ihmisten epärationaalisesta käyttäytymisestä joukkorahoittajina. 
Avainsanat  osakepohjainen joukkorahoitus, behavioristinen rahoitus, ylimerkitseminen, 
rajoitettu rationaalisuus, ihmisten käyttäytymistiede 
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1. Introduction 
In the early days of August 2018, the front-page of a Nordic equity-online crowdfunding 
platform called Invesdor looks similar to any other webpage of a growing company in the 
present decade: large and vivid pictures run through the homepage while clear and smooth text 
font makes sentences easy to read. Only pink and beige dominate the website so that the color 
spectrum does not become too cluttered. From this layout, the main idea of Invesdor – promote 
equity crowdfunding campaigns through online – grab the investor’s attention effectively. 
However, when taking a closer look at the campaign success metrics, the visitor makes a 
distinguishable and even puzzling notion: all of the ventures in the front-page have passed their 
initial financing target with a clear margin. By now, one campaign with a due date in 5 days 
has raised 135% of its needs. Ten other campaigns have already closed: their success ranges 
from 129% to 661% of the original goal.1 
 
During the 21st century, entrepreneurial finance has received much attention. Previously, small-
sized companies have been able to raise financing for their future endeavors for instance 
through business angels, venture capitalists and IPOs. Nevertheless, during the past decade, a 
new way of seeking financial support called crowdfunding has taken off. In 2015, the market 
of crowdfunding surged to 34.4 billion globally, increasing 112% from 2014 (Massolution, 
2016). Alongside the technological progress, also the associated social media channels have 
enabled crowdfunding to enter the alternative financing market (Ordanini et al., 2011). 
 
As the phenomenon has been developing only recently, also the publications surrounding 
crowdfunding are limited. Additionally, among the different types of crowdfunding, reward-
based and donation-based research have dominated the field. In contrast, equity crowdfunding 
has been gaining popularity only recently (Wallmeroth et al., 2017: 60). This is at least partly 
due to regulatory limitations: in US for example, equity crowdfunding was only limited to 
accredited investors until May 2016 (Abrams, 2017), restraining the growth of the financial 
product. Furthermore in Finland, a new legislation incepted in September 2016 has supported 
the growth, functioning and diversification of crowdfunding markets lately by ensuring 
sufficient investor protection (Finnish State Council, 2016). According to the Ministry of 
Finance in Finland, ventures collected finance of 153 million euros in 2016 from crowdfunding 
platforms, when in 2015 the amount was 70,5 million, thus reaching a growth rate of 117% 
                                               
1 See Appendix A for the front-page of Invesdor on 1st of August, 2018 
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(VM, 2016). Consequently, this paper attempts to explore the phenomena and fill the apparent 
research gaps arising from the market changes. 
 
The paper focuses on a specific phenomenon in the equity crowdfunding context called 
overfunding. While the success drivers leading the campaign to reach its initial goal have been 
already in the spotlight in crowdfunding research (see e.g. Mollick, 2014; Vulkan et al., 2015; 
Koch & Siering, 2015; Lukkarinen et al., 2016), overfunding has been studied with a 
comprehensive framework and hypotheses building only in the reward-based crowdfunding 
context (Koch, 2016). Due to the lack of current research, the study utilizes other 
entrepreneurial finance literature as well as over-subscription phenomenon in IPOs. 
 
As the behavior of the crowd can be entirely different after the project has successfully reached 
its target, I also examine factors that may affect the crowd's decision-making process leading 
to overfunding. In an individual campaign, there can be hundreds of investors choosing on 
which projects to back (Lukkarinen et al. 2016: 6). However, the decision-making process of 
amateur investors in crowdfunding literature has been researched only by a handful of articles 
(see e.g., Marom & Sade, 2013; Moritz et al., 2015; Kim & Viswanathan, 2018) although we 
have extensive approval that ordinary people do not make rational choices regularly (see e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1986; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Consequently, Herbert 
Simon’s (1947) concept of bounded rationality together with the human biases and heuristics 
work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974) will be merged to build a framework to 
deal with the overfunding phenomena in equity crowdfunding. 
 
Furthermore, the research has significant implications for practitioners. In crowdfunding, 
entrepreneurs often are focusing solely on reaching the funding target to receive the necessary 
financing for their next undertaking. Although the concern is valid, small enterprises could 
exceed their funding targets and eventually accelerate their growth story quicker by overfunding 
the campaign with closely the same amount of effort and resources. In addition, regulators 
should take into consideration the possible drawbacks of human heuristic misuse of non-expert 
investors in the legislative environment. 
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2. Research questions 
Although the investments in crowdfunding campaigns have been increasing and determinants 
for success have been studied for some years now, overfunding and its drivers have not received 
as much attention (Wallmeroth et al. 2017: 60). Thus, I will tackle the issue and endeavor to 
investigate the drivers that could be associated with overfunding in equity crowdfunding 
campaigns and discuss the implications for both scholars and practitioners. Furthermore, I will 
explore the decision-making heuristics of individuals and groups, which may result in 
overfunding. Thus, the research address a gap in the crowdfunding literature with two questions, 
the first one being: 
 
RQ1: What are the key drivers of overfunding in online equity crowdfunding? 
 
As equity crowdfunding is missing a comprehensive research background, the study connects 
two other forms of entrepreneurial finance literature to overfunding: non-equity-based 
crowdfunding and IPOs. Firstly, equity crowdfunding can be addressed in the context of 
rewards-, donations, and debt-based crowdfunding, with which it shares similarities (Bradford, 
2012). There, overfunding has been most researched in the donation and reward-based 
crowdfunding models. On the other hand, similarly to crowdfunding, success in IPOs is 
critically tied to investor demand and the percentage funding raised has been calculated with 
the over-subscription ratio. According to Low and Yong (2011), over-subscriptions are often 
taking place in Asian IPO markets, which employ a fixed-price typed of mechanism. 
Additionally, although overfunding is not measured in early-stage venture capital, the research 
reflects its findings to the phenomena of angel investments, since it also acts as a mechanism 
in early stage company success. Figure 1 presents the initial similarities and dissimilarities of 
the different types. 
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    Figure 1: Different types of funding mechanisms in entrepreneurial finance 
The literature on crowdfunding is scarce and thus the research takes influence on other 
financing forms although several dissimilarities exist: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overfunding has been studied concerning the reward-based crowdfunding model, where 
Mollick (2014) finds that successful project achieve only small margins and in the case of 
failing, the margins are more pronounced. Additionally, overfunded campaigns are specially 
exposed to experience a delay in product delivery to the investor, probably since large projects 
are tend to draw more expectations and complexity. Later, Koch (2016) continued the 
discussion by studying the overfunding phenomena in reward- and donation-based 
crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. The author discovered that project founders’ actions, the 
platform providers’ actions as well as altruistic motives all affect the level of overfunding of a 
project. Additionally, in the few past years, research in equity crowdfunding has picked up the 
pace on overfunding. Novel research by Virtala (2017) touched the issue of overfunding while 
concentrating mostly on limited attention in equity crowdfunding in the Nordic countries. 
Furthermore, Vulkan et al. (2016) briefly explore overfunding while analyzing the drivers 
leading to a campaign success. 
Traditional VC funding IPOs Crowdfunding 
Funding 
Rational 
Pros & 
Cons 
Investors 
Obtain financing for future 
growth after business plan 
validation 
Obtain financing for future 
growth after business plan 
validation 
IPO funding to grow business 
further & raise more funds 
+ VCs are expert investors 
who carefully certify concepts 
+ VCs are cautious where the 
business spends its money 
- Founders often focused on 
next founding round (hinders 
innovation) 
 
Several stakeholders along 
with ordinary people 
Several stakeholders along 
with ordinary people 
Business Angels & 
Venture Capitalist 
+ Crowd support and business 
plan validation 
+ Act as a marketing tool 
- Transparency risks on use of 
proceeds and product 
development, and the risk of 
non-expert investor bias. 
+ Crowd support 
+ Relative to the other funding 
types, founders receive 
significant funding to improve 
business 
- IPOs heavily regulated 
- Significant work in preparing 
investor prospectus 
Overfund
ing? 
- No current research on 
overfunding  
+ Overfunding is measured by 
the percentage raised in an 
individual campaign 
+ Measured by IPO over-
subscription ratio in fixed-
price typed of a mechanism 
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In the IPO context, over-subscription is a phenomenon that has been researched widely (see 
e.g., Agrawal, 2008; Low & Yong, 2011; Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996). Low and Yong (2011) 
examined the subscription of IPOs in Malaysia, and identified that, basic campaign conditions 
such as the offer price and the timing of the IPO (hot issue market), influenced the magnitude 
of IPO subscription. Additionally, Tajuddin et al. (2015) report that company size has a negative 
relationship between over-subscription since big companies are considered to offer lower initial 
returns due to low risk and information asymmetry.  
 
The second question of the research will shed light on the individual and group behavior of 
crowdfunding campaigns. Some papers have already evaluated the roles and behaviors of actors 
involved in crowdfunding (Marom & Sade, 2013; Moritz et al., 2015; Kim & Viswanathan, 
2018), but as the overfunding phenomenon has been studied only in few papers, also the human 
heuristic research related to it is limited. This will be clarified with the following question:  
 
RQ2: What are the critical crowd heuristics, which contribute to a campaign to be 
overfunded? 
 
This question will be a discussion after constructing the hypothesis framework for independent 
variables, and receiving results for the first question. Literature of individual and group 
behavior will be connected to the crowdfunding phenomena. Three social influences will be 
emphasized – peer pressure, priming effects and information effects – which are further broken 
down into several different heuristics. The framework takes influence from bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1947), behavioral heuristics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) and recent research made 
in behavioral finance. The main idea is that the crowdfunding mechanism is a complex system, 
which is not predicted solely by individual behavior: parts and the whole differ because what 
matters are the interactions between such parts. The objective is not to give definite answers 
but act as a discussion starter on the heuristics of overfunding.   
 
The study utilizes both exploratory design and quantitative methods to explore the research 
questions. Firstly, as the phenomena of overfunding in equity crowdfunding is without 
comprehensive previous reports, I use explanatory research to lay the groundwork for the 
study’s hypotheses and for upcoming research to identify issues that could be concentrated on 
in the future. Explorative research has been found to shed light on a phenomena that has been 
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previously explored only fractionally and thus, could bring order to connections and causal 
mechanisms among researchers (Reiter, 2017). Secondly, as explorative studies may be subject 
to look at the phenomena only by the surface, I use quantitative data to assist in the 
interpretation and generalization of final results.  
 
As I explore the research questions, the study contributes to the low number of reports exploring 
the equity-based crowdfunding and human heuristics. Additionally, the research combines IPO 
literature to crowdfunding, a method that is not widespread, due to the low amount of research 
on the overfunding phenomenon. Finally, it is among the first studies that use a dataset from 
Invesdor which is a dominant player among the equity crowdfunding platforms in the Nordic 
countries (for these few previous researches see Lukkarinen et al., 2016; Virtala, 2017). 
 
Figure 2: Research positioning 
The following figure presents the three most important previous studies for the report at hand, 
and how it shares similarities and dissimilarities between all of them:  
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The rest of the report is structured as follows: the next section will go through the previous 
literature on entrepreneurial finance and crowdfunding, ultimately leading to the overfunding 
phenomenon and human heuristics. Chapter 4 briefly covers the data and methodology of the 
report. Chapter 5 presents the hypotheses of the study based on the previous literature on 
crowdfunding and behavioral finance. Chapter 6 will go through the empirical findings and 
discussion of the results. Lastly, Chapters 7 and 8 will present the limitations of the study, give 
way for possible future research and conclude.   
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3. Literature review 
The research takes influences from previous crowdfunding, entrepreneurial finance, IPO and 
behavioral finance literature. The findings in these areas are connected in the literature review: 
Figure 3: The literature review framework 
The literature review has four steps and connects crowdfunding landscape, determinants of 
success and behavioral aspects to the overfunding phenomena.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Crowdfunding landscape Determinants of success Overfunding 
1. Crowdfunding fundamentals 
2. Equity Crowdfunding 
3. Crowdfunding community 
The objective is to present the 
principles of crowdfunding: 
what is the phenomena, how it 
works and who are involved 
1. Crowdfunding success 
drivers 
2. Angel investment and 
venture capital success drivers 
The objective is to present 
previous findings on success 
drivers in the crowdfunding 
context while linking it 
together with broader 
entrepreneurial finance 
literature 
1. Overfunding in 
crowdfunding 
2. Over-subscription in IPOs 
The scarce literature on 
overfunding phenomena in 
crowdfunding literature will 
be presented while reflecting 
it to IPO over-subscriptions 
Step 4 
Bounded rationality and behavioral heuristics  
1. Anchoring 
2. Herding behavior 
3. Collective Conservatism 
1. Availability heuristic 
2. Mental accounting 
3. Vividness 
Peer pressure Priming effects Information effects 
1. Representativeness bias 
2. The status quo bias 
3. Present heuristic 
Lastly, previous literature on human heuristics of individual and group behavior will be connected to 
the crowdfunding phenomena. Three social influences will be emphasized – peer pressure, priming 
effects and information effects – which are further broken down into several different heuristics. The 
framework takes influence from bounded rationality (Simon, 1947), behavioral heuristics (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1974) and recent research made in behavioral finance. The main idea is that the 
crowdfunding mechanism is a complex system, which is not predicted solely by utility maximization 
and individual behavior: parts and the whole differ because what matters are the interactions 
between such parts. The main objective is to present a coherent human heuristic framework for 
equity crowdfunding while finding reasons to the overfunding phenomena. 
RQ1 
RQ2 
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First, we will take a look at the crowdfunding landscape, bridging crowdfunding fundamentals 
to equity crowdfunding and crowdfunding community. It introduces us briefly to the whole 
phenomena and the limited research made in crowdfunding. Secondly, the determinants of 
success in entrepreneurial finance literature will be dealt. Some work has been done on the 
various success drivers of individual campaigns although the findings are partly mixed. Since 
the research is only taking its first steps, I will reflect the results to traditional VC funding. 
Thirdly, the research at hand will turn its focus to the central part of the study: the phenomenon 
of overfunding. The research uses partly a framework developed by Koch (2016) in his reward-
based crowdfunding study The Phenomenon of Project Overfunding on Online Crowdfunding 
Platforms–Analyzing the Drivers of Overfunding. Those findings are reflected to the incoherent 
equity crowdfunding overfunding phenomenon.  After, the over-subscription drivers in fixed-
typed IPOs are explained, which has been previously neglected from equity crowdfunding 
studies. 
Lastly, the previous literature on behavioral aspects of individuals and groups will be connected 
to the crowdfunding phenomena. A framework original to this study is constructed to deal with 
the crowdfunding and overfunding phenomena. The current literature on crowdfunding 
heuristics is scattered, and thus, the objective is to present a somewhat coherent framework to 
not only deal with the overfunding phenomena in this study but also to act as a platform in 
future researches. 
 
3.1. Crowdfunding landscape 
3.1.1. Crowdfunding fundamentals 
The term crowdfunding dates back to 2006 when it was derived from crowdsourcing and 
microfinance (Everett, 2014). Since its origination, crowdfunding has been defined in numerous 
different ways. Quite recently, Mollick (2014) defined the concept as 
‘’efforts by founders —cultural, social, and for-profit—to fund their ventures by drawing on 
relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the internet, 
without standard financial intermediaries (Mollick, 2014: 1)’’. 
Due to its novel nature, crowdfunding is changing shape and is used in many different manners. 
However, three central features have stayed and endured the transformation: the focus on 
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technology, the power of the crowd and capital funding. The crowdfunding process is 
significantly dependable on technology as the campaigns are placed in websites and the 
marketing often relies on social media that enable awareness. On the other hand, through social 
forums, individuals can dynamically contribute in the crowdfunding process, share visions 
about new business models and thus enable the power of the crowd (Ordanini et al., 2011). With 
a large group of people as audience and investors, crowdfunding platforms have the power to 
test new products and run new marketing campaigns (Belleflamme et al., 2010), establishing a 
strong bond between the company seeking the funding and the crowd. However, the ultimate 
target of a crowdfunding campaign is to find financial capital without traditional intermediaries 
such as banks (Harms, 2007). Successful crowdfunding companies are a potential good long-
term investment for funders, possibly leading to additional financing in the future (Mollick, 
2013). 
From this background, crowdfunding has emerged as an increasingly important platform to 
seek for financing and thus enable companies to meet growth targets. Statistics from around the 
world reveal the increasing significance of crowdfunding: Massolution, a crowdsourcing 
research company, estimated that the global crowdfunding market surged to $34.4B in 2015, 
while in 2014 the number was at $16.2B (Massolution, 2016). This indicates a compelling 
growth of 112% and the trend is forecasted to continue in the near future. 
The steady growth has also meant that crowdfunding is nowadays used to support projects in 
diverse industries. Additionally, the web-based platforms and social networks support the 
expansion and they also decrease the barriers of distance-related economic frictions: in 
crowdfunding campaigns, a mean distance between entrepreneur and investor of approximately 
3,000 miles is found (Agrawal et al., 2014). 
As the use of crowdfunding has bolstered, it has devolved into several different funding 
categories. Bradford (2012) classifies five subcategories: (1) donations-based, (2) reward-
based, (3) lending-based, (4) prepurchase, and the (5) equity-based crowdfunding. In model 1, 
the investor does not receive anything back from the investor, but rather contributes to a greater 
good. What comes to the Model 2 and 4, Wallmeroth et al. (2017: 51) argue that they are closely 
related and therefore the pre-purchase model is often replaced in terminology by the reward-
based model. In these forms, the investor often gains the product or the service of the company 
where the money has been invested. The third model is a debt-based form, and it is centered on 
loans provided by the investor to the venture which can include interest payments (Wallmeroth 
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et al., 2017: 51). Finally, regarding the equity-based crowdfunding, the investor receives a share 
of the company in return for the investment made, leading to a value and profit sharing 
agreement (Bradford, 2012). 
In addition, a distinction between equity-based crowdfunding and non-equity based 
crowdfunding can be made based on profit sharing: the first four models of the previous 
paragraph can be said to be non-equity based as the backer never receives a part or a stake of 
the company when making an investment. Thus, the investors cannot gain any returns on the 
future profits of a company. 
 
3.1.2. Equity crowdfunding 
Continuing from the previous chapter, equity crowdfunding is different from all the other 
models, the so-called non-equity crowdfunding models, in a fundamental way. In equity 
crowdfunding, investors receive a prominent part or share of a company against the money they 
have invested. In contrast, in non-equity crowdfunding, the ventures receiving contributions 
often only give a product or experience in exchange for the funding they have obtained. An 
important distinction between the two types also appears later in company life cycle: in equity 
crowdfunding, the investor receives interest or profit if a venture succeeds, but in non-equity 
crowdfunding, none of the backers receive money in later stages (Bradford, 2012).   
From this background, Ahlers et al., (2015) have characterized equity crowdfunding as: 
a method of financing, whereby an entrepreneur sells a specified amount of equity or bond-like 
shares in a company to a group of (small) investors through an open call for funding on 
Internet-based platforms (Ahlers et al., 2015: 958). 
Ahlers et al. (2015) base this definition on previous research made on crowdfunding where the 
definition has not been explicit: Firstly, Bradford (2012: 24) examining the legislation of 
crowdfunding, explains equity crowdfunding as a model in which investors receive a share of 
the profits or return of the business they are helping to fund - the central difference between 
equity and non-equity based crowdfunding. Equity crowdfunding, however, shares some 
similarities with the non-equity based crowdfunding method. The fact that 1) entrepreneurs 
make an open call for funding on a crowdfunding platform, 2) crowdfunding platform facilitates 
the transaction by settling the payments and 3) crowdfunding investments in start-ups are 
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generally much smaller than venture capital or angel investments, could be seen in all of the 
five different crowdfunding models (Wallmeroth et al., 2018). 
 
However, equity crowdfunding has been more strictly regulated because backers receive 
securities in exchange for their investment. Until recently, equity crowdfunding was even 
prohibited under US securities law for non-accredited investors. However, in Europe, equity 
crowdfunding was supported by the favorable regulatory environment for instance in the United 
Kingdom (Vulkan et al., 2016: 2) which contributed to a high activity in equity crowdfunding: 
data indicates that as much as 35.5% of all small sized venture deals in the UK has gone through 
equity crowdfunding sites in 2015 (Beauhurst, 2015). Moreover in Finland, a new legislation 
has been incepted in September 2016 which has supported the growth, functioning and 
diversification of financial markets by ensuring sufficient investor protection. The law has 
placed several obligations to the providers of crowdfunding platforms such as the basic 
information and risk disclosure of every project (Finnish State Council, 2016). According to 
the Ministry of Finance, businesses collected finance of 153 million euros in 2016, when in 
2015 the amount was 70,5 million, thus reaching a growth rate of 117% (VM, 2016). 
 
The slow development of equity crowdfunding can be seen in the research field as well. The 
amount of publications of equity-based crowdfunding is much lower than in the other 
crowdfunding forms. The progress has been at least partly due to the previously mentioned 
regulatory constraints, which restrained the amount of equity-based campaigns executed on 
different platforms. Thus, the findings are still mostly basic, and a large part of the available 
publications are based on European data, which have only gained traction from 2014 onwards 
(Wallmeroth, 2018: 53). Nevertheless, some research has been already made. For instance, the 
success drivers leading to the campaign to reach its initial goal has been studied by several 
articles (see e.g. Mollick, 2014; Vulkan et al., 2015; Koch & Siering, 2015; Lukkarinen et al., 
2016), although the results have been irregular in many ways. Overall, it is evident that many 
research gaps exist and the current state of the research suffers from the lack of sufficient data 
(Wallmeroth, 2018: 58). 
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3.1.3. Crowdfunding community 
In addition to the fundamental understanding of crowdfunding as a phenomenon, it is essential 
to recognize the many expectations and different actors involved in crowdfunding campaigns. 
Stakeholder approach (see e.g., Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Mason & Simmons, 2014) suggests 
that long-term value creation of a company is only possible when interests of all the stakeholder 
groups are compatible and satisfied. 
In a typical crowdfunding campaign, the three major stakeholders involved are the founders, 
the backers and the platform provider (Valančienė & Jegelevičiūtė, 2014). Firstly, the existence 
of crowdfunding platforms enables companies of different size to display concepts for possible 
consumers and request financing. The platforms use marketing efforts to promote the 
businesses and create communities on their website while generating money from 
advertisements and taking their share of money from the companies being listed on their 
platform. Thus, they benefit from high activity in the platform and on the other hand from a 
high number of successful campaigns (Agrawal et al., 2013). Secondly, the founders of the idea 
or the company seek for the best platform to list their campaign to maximize their probabilities 
to be funded. With their business plan, they present an investment possibility for investors and 
backers (Beaulieu, 2015). This last primary stakeholder group typically consist mostly of non-
expert investors who would be restricted to finance the companies if the platforms would not 
exist (Valančienė & Jegelevičiūtė, 2014). In many cases, among the vast array of different 
backers are anchor investors such as angel investors, VC Funds and banks, who invest in a more 
considerable sum of money at the beginning of the campaign. Whether or not the backer is an 
institutional investor or ordinary people, in the beginning, they evaluate the different campaigns 
in the platform and choose the ones they would like to invest money. 
In addition to the three primary stakeholder groups, the social context can be found to impact 
in crowdfunding campaigns as a stakeholder as the three primary stakeholder groups of 
crowdfunding can be seen to arise from the society. Increased efforts by the society to promote 
entrepreneurial companies could lead to increased popularity of the other crowdfunding 
stakeholders (Valančienė & Jegelevičiūtė, 2014). Furthermore, regulation conducted by the 
society plays a vital role in promoting crowdfunding in the social context, since making 
crowdfunding legal, safe and fair for all stakeholders is the first step for the whole ecosystem 
to work (Beaulieu, 2015). The crowdfunding legislation is still scattered around the world 
(Gelfond & Foti, 2012) giving crowdfunding various nuances in different continents, and on 
the other hand, making crowdfunding context more complex phenomenon to understand. 
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3.2. Determinants of success 
3.2.1. Success drivers of crowdfunding 
Although the crowdfunding research is only taking its first steps, some work has been done on 
the various success drivers of individual campaigns. There exist several different factors 
affecting the project success, such as primary variables (for instance, the duration and initial 
capital received), but also soft determinants such as the communication during the 
crowdfunding campaign. Next, the literature examining the determinants of success in the 
crowdfunding campaigns is presented, although the research is still developing and many 
contradictory findings have been discovered. 
Basic campaign conditions in the crowdfunding platform have been reported to have a profound 
impact on the campaign success. Analyzing 636 campaigns, encompassing 17,188 investors 
and 64,831 investments between 2012 and 2015, Vulkan et al. (2015: 6) present that there are 
four factors affecting the probability of success: (1) the financing accumulated in the first week 
of the campaign; (2) the investment goal set by the promoters; (3) the most significant amount 
pledged by a single backer; and (4) the number of backers in the campaign. 
Several studies support the findings of Vulkan et al. (2015) and the importance of basic 
campaign conditions. For example, Koch and Siering (2015) and Mollick (2014) demonstrated 
that funding goal is a vital factor in explaining the amount of money the project collects. What 
comes to the campaign duration, the evidence is mixed: Burtch et al. (2013) report that 
increasing the time of the campaign builds attention among the audience thus leading to a 
desired project result, while Mollick (2014) identify that shorter durations are associated with 
successful campaigns. Additionally, Lukkarinen et al. (2016) discovered that the minimum 
investment has a strong negative relationship with the number of investors and with the amount 
raised. What comes to the early investments of crowdfunding campaigns, it has been studied 
that initially well-performing campaigns drive even more investors to the campaign 
(Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2013). 
In addition, the type of the venture seeking the funding has been noticed to affect campaign 
success: Lukkarinen et al. (2016) report that companies offering B2C products or services, 
rather than B2B, are more successful. Furthermore, different industries might affect 
crowdfunding success; analyzing 4,304 projects from Kickstarter, Marom & Sade (2013) report 
that artistic projects achieve their campaign target more often than their technological peers. 
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The founders’ soft capital has been demonstrated to have a significant effect on campaign 
success. Individual personal and business network correlates positively with success in 
campaigns (Giudici et al., 2013). Hekman and Brussee (2013) support the finding by concluding 
that successful creators have more friends but a sparse network; whereas unsuccessful creators 
have a dense network. Mollick (2014) continued the discussion by stating that individual 
networks are an essential driver in Kickstarter. Using Invesdor’s data, Lukkarinen et al. (2016) 
found that utilizing social media networks effectively is associated with expected positive 
outcome both regarding the number of investors and concerning the amount raised. 
Information uploaded by the founders to the crowdfunding platform is evidently a critical 
determinant of campaign success. Virtala (2017) discovered that entrepreneurs who contain 
videos on their page tend to be more successful than projects that do not feature a video on their 
project site. It has also been found that including images to the platform (Koch & Siering 2015) 
and the depth of the project description (Xiao et al., 2014) increases the funding success. 
However, Lukkarinen et al. (2016) surprisingly found that providing financials is not 
significantly related to the amount raised.  
In addition to the material the founders provide to the platform, they need to make frequent 
updates and communication with the funding crowd. Xu et al. (2014) report that the 
communication between project creators and the potential funders during a campaign is more 
predictive of success than the project page. In addition, based on a qualitative study in equity-
based crowdfunding Moritz et al. (2015) find that that the communication between peer 
investors and other experienced investors influence the decision-making process of non-expert 
individuals. 
One additional aspect of the uploaded information is how much details regarding the founder’s 
background is provided. The people behind the business have a profound effect on how well 
the company thrives. In equity-based crowdfunding, Moritz et al. (2015) found that the 
management team’s impression has a central part in decreasing information loopholes between 
individual backers. In addition, proven work and educational track record have been a common 
aspect with venture capital funding increasing the probability of the company to get funding 
(Hsu, 2007). 
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3.2.2. Venture capital and angel investment success drivers 
As the crowdfunding phenomenon is still developing and lacking a broad research base, I will 
next present additional studies in angel investment and venture capital literature, which are part 
of the entrepreneurial finance landscape. Both of the financing forms are important to this 
research as some of the venture capitalists and business angels might act as an ‘’anchor’’ 
investor in crowdfunding campaigns helping to identify successful companies but also acting 
as a mechanism to help realize the future potential. In addition, despite the differences of 
venture capital and crowdfunding environments, it has been reported that both VCs and 
crowdfunders assess entrepreneurial quality in similar ways, but that crowdfunding is prone to 
some geographic and human biases with the way that VCs signals of quality (Mollick, 2013). 
As the company takes its first steps, the firm gets its funding typically from the founders' 
pockets or friends and family. After the entrepreneurs have been able to get the operations 
going, they often turn to venture capitalist or business angels to seek investments. However, if 
they are not able to raise money from these initial backers, the whole existence of the company 
is threatened. This is called in the entrepreneurial literature as the funding gap: the lack of 
formal external financing for the growth of a new venture (Lam, 2010). Some argue that the 
gap is due to the tendency of venture capitalist’ investments only in larger ventures with 
repeated investments to their already owned enterprises (Freear et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
Block and Sandner (2009) report that economic circumstances can affect negatively to the 
funding gap: after the financial crisis early stage start-ups were in a problematic stance vis-à-
vis to venture capitalist as money was withhold. Crowdfunding provides a potentially 
innovative way to decrease the funding gap although earlier research has indicated that more 
developed ventures reach the funding target more frequently than the ones in seed stages 
(Virtala, 2017). 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984: 1057) interviewed venture capitalists to find out the important factors 
influencing their portfolio selection. The 46 venture capitalists which participated in the study 
revealed that segmentation plays a vital part in the selection process: 29 respondents say that 
market sector is used as a screening criterion while 22 indicated that company stage is taken 
into consideration. However, only 9 respondents limit their investment strategy to a certain 
geographical area. The result thus indicate that the market sector is the most noticeable 
segmentation characteristic in venture capitalists criterion. Later, Norton and Tenenbaum 
(1993) report that venture capitalists specialize in certain industries to exploit their technical 
and product expertise.   
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Often cited in venture capital research is the importance of the enterprises top managements’ 
knowledge in the investment decision making. By interviewing venture capitalists, McMillan 
et al. (1985) identify that five of the top ten most crucial venture capital investment criteria had 
to do with the entrepreneur’s experience or personality. More recently, Burton et al. (2002) 
reveal that entrepreneurs with prior career experience have better chances in obtaining external 
financing at the time of the founding. Other human resources are essential as well, as the 
company’s alliances have been found to point towards beneficial human capital (Baum and 
Silverman, 2004). 
Additionally, expert investor analysis such as industry trends, environmental threats to the 
business, the level of competition and the degree of product differentiation are done by venture 
capitalists when making investments (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999). Company's core 
competencies, notably product characteristics, potential revenues and exit opportunities are 
analyzed hand in hand with the external market analysis (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Manigart et 
al., 1997). 
When the company reaches more mature stage, a study by Barry et al. (1990) has analyzed the 
venture capitalists role in the IPO process. By analyzing 433 IPOs by venture-capital-backed 
companies, the authors note that venture capitalist take considerable equity positions in IPOs 
and provide rigorous monitoring services for the general public. Their investments act as 
positive and important signals to non-expert individual investors, decreasing the amount of 
under-subscribed IPOs. 
In contrast to venture capital, business angels channel investments to high growth potential 
ventures with their personal agenda and decision process. They are not required to validate their 
choices from anyone else. Prior research has found several different business angel investment 
criteria’s: as they are professional investors, they look at traditional investment criteria such as 
return and risk tradeoff (Feeney et al., 1999), while some might be more personal like interest 
and chemistry with the management team (Mason & Stark, 2004). The ability to contribute is 
clearly more profound in angel investments than crowdfunding, as business angels quite often 
can influence the ventures day-to-day business. 
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3.3. Overfunding 
3.3.1. Overfunding in crowdfunding 
The phenomenon of overfunding has been examined only in a few articles in the crowdfunding 
literature and mostly restrict to the reward-based crowdfunding research. However, more 
studies have been made in the IPO context, which is utilized in this research as well.   
Vulkan et al. (2016) briefly explore overfunding in the equity crowdfunding landscape: 
campaigns that fail to raise the desired capital tend to do so by a large margin, while most 
successful campaigns overfund, going nearly 300% over the intial goal. At the same time in the 
reward-based crowdfunding area, while analyzing the determinants of success only in 
technology projects in reward-based crowdfunding, Cordova et al. (2015) discovered that there 
are 3 drivers that have an effect on project overfunding in technology-based campaigns across 
four crowdfunding platforms: the number of funders, the duration of the project and the mean 
amount contributed per day. At the same time, a higher amount of funding requested by the 
founder is associated with a lower overfunding.  
Virtala (2017) continued the discussion of overfunding while concentrating mostly on limited 
attention in equity crowdfunding in the Nordic countries. Using Invesdor’s data and covering 
147 crowdfunding campaigns, the research demonstrates that adding a video and a graphic 
representation of growth, providing salient information on the founding team and writing 
understandable descriptions are all determinants of successful campaigns. These results hold 
the measure of success as the percentage of funding target achieved. 
None of those above-mentioned studies cover the overfunding phenomena in a comprehensive 
framework. The first study to do this was a research by Koch (2016) who studied the 
phenomenon in a reward-based crowdfunding platform Kickstarter with a dataset of 40,833 
projects. The author identified that the founders, the platform and the investors (crowd) all 
affect overfunding: ‘’Firstly, projects tend to be more overfunded if founders offer more levels 
of rewards, provide more information (in the form of texts, pictures, and videos), communicate 
actively, and reveal a high number of friends, of other backed campaigns, and of created 
projects. Secondly, the platform can influence funding results by their actions. If a project 
campaign promise to contribute substantially to the platform's revenue, the platform could 
place this project more prominently on the websites or indicate quality by labels to further 
support its overfunding.’’ (Koch, 2016: 12-13) Clearly, in the case of equity crowdfunding 
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stakeholders might behave differently, as the compensation of investment formulates from 
equity instead of a product or service reward.  
 
3.3.2. Over-subscriptions in IPOs 
IPOs arguably differ from equity crowdfunding. The legislation is more burdensome in many 
ways, and extreme action takes place when regulators and analysts review the financial 
statements and prospectus before a company can go public. However, many similarities also 
exist: non-expert individuals are included in both processes, equity is at stake and many similar 
variables alter the success of the campaign. Furthermore, as with crowdfunding, the IPO process 
involves informational asymmetries between the company stakeholders. Consequently, several 
signals are sent to convey firm quality to amateur investors, who cannot easily distinguish 
between good and bad IPOs (Reber & Fong, 2006).  Thus, prior research in investor demand as 
measured by IPO over-subscription act as an excellent platform for understanding both the 
drivers of overfunding phenomena along with the heuristic studies in equity crowdfunding. 
Low and Yong (2011) report that over-subscriptions are often taking place for example in the 
UK and Asian IPO markets, which employ a fixed-price issue mechanism. Agarwal et al. (2008) 
document that Hong Kong stock market is highly volatile and some IPOs oversubscribe by over 
1000% the initial shares offered. In the UK, Brennan and Franks (1997) discover that over-
subscriptions are negatively correlated with the level of issue price: the over-subscription ratio 
surges until a level of 40% underpricing in tandem. Both studies report that over-subscriptions 
are not one-time occurring events at IPO markets. 
Furthermore, those IPOs that over-subscribe have been reported to perform well in the 
aftermarket, although the evidence is mixed in some ways. For instance, Cornelli and Goldreich 
(2003) report that the level of oversubscription and first-day aftermarket return are positively 
associated. However, the evidence becomes unclear in longer-term returns: Agarwal et al. 
(2008) find that in a holding period of 36-month, high-demand IPOs underperform low-demand 
portfolios. Furthermore, Tajuddin et al. (2015) report that company size has a negative 
relationship between over-subscription since big companies are considered to offer lower initial 
returns due to low risk and information asymmetry. 
Although the IPO aftermarket studies are not consistent, there are several reasons why a 
company might see it as desirable to over-subscribe. Firstly, substantial over-subscription in 
IPO might act as a valuable signal of company’s worth (Cornelli & Goldreich, 2003). Highly 
20 
 
 
oversubscribed IPOs can be viewed to increase the reputation of the issuing firm and indicate 
the perceived quality (Vong, 2006). Secondly, promoting over-subscription allows broad initial 
ownership, which in turn increases secondary-market liquidity (Booth & Chua, 1996). 
However, the reputation might be more pronounced with B2C companies as they have been 
identified to experience higher media levels in the month of IPO relative to the population of 
B2B internet companies (Demers & Lewellen, 2001). 
The possible positive side-effects raise a question on what are the ways to increase the 
probabilities to over-subscribe. Guo and Brooks (2009) report that companies should reduce 
the duration of the campaign, as investors evaluate the possible downsides and choose issues 
with a shorter duration to decrease their costs of financing. Low and Yong (2011) reported from 
a sample of 368 Malaysian IPOs during the period from 2000 to 2007 that over-subscription is 
negatively correlated with offer price but is not significantly related to issue size. Additionally, 
they found that firms should time their offerings to coincide with periods of low volume IPO 
activity. 
The volume activity of IPOs have been additionally studied with formal mathematical example 
by Ljungqvist et al. (2006). They argue with their theoretical model that as the IPO market 
activity increases, lower-quality companies are taken public, resulting in a decline in the quality 
of the average issuer. Data based research by Benveniste et al. (2003) adds that as the quantity 
of enterprises going public at the same time increases, the more significant the amount of 
underpricing of IPOs. On the other hand, time-periods with high amount of IPOs have been 
related with increased amount of enthusiasm among the crowd and companies benefit from 
markets’ positive sentiment (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003). 
The literature in IPO oversubscriptions is much more comprehensive compared to the research 
made in crowdfunding. It gives background to the drivers of over-subscriptions but also to 
aftermarket performance and non-expert investors’ behavioral patterns. 
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3.4. Bounded rationality and heuristics in crowdfunding 
You let one ant stand up to us, and they all might stand up! 
- A Bug’s Life, Walt Disney 
Ant colonies present a highly structured social organization, despite the insufficiencies of their 
individuals. Because of this organization, ant colonies can accomplish complex tasks that in 
some cases far exceed the individual capabilities of a single ant. (Dorigo & Stutzle, 2010) The 
collaborations matter more than the nature of the units, and interactions can obey 
straightforward rules.  
 
Like the ant societies in our example, also crowdfunding depends on the power of the whole. 
The crowdfunding community relies on the smooth collaboration between different 
stakeholders and previously it has been demonstrated that the crowd is just as skilled in 
selecting potentially successful projects as conventional experts (Mollick & Nanda, 2015). By 
building up individual decision-making, humans can end up creating better decisions overall. 
To comprehend the underlying mechanism of this decision-making process, the understanding 
of human and group behavior becomes highly essential. 
 
For the research at hand, the previous studies on human and group decision-making by 
behavioral economist will be utilized to understand why specific drivers strengthen the 
phenomena of overfunding. We ground our arguments to Herbert Simon’s (1947) concept of 
bounded rationality, that individuals do not always engage in extensive information gathering 
and processing to identify optimal choices (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947). Together 
with the human biases and heuristics work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974), the 
bounded rationality theory has changed the way scientists look at human decision-making. 
More recently, the study of human judgment has expanded profoundly to different areas of life 
and crowdfunding is not an exception. We will next take a closer look at the original bounded 
rationality theory, human heuristics proposed by Kahneman and Tversky as well as the 
following research that has been made in behavioral finance. Consequently, a framework of 
different heuristics and possible significances to crowdfunding will be constructed and 
presented. 
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3.4.1. Bounded rationality 
I simply picked the first profession that sounded fascinating. 
- Herbert A. Simon, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics 
The father of bounded rationality theorem, Herbert A. Simon, explains the concept in the 
following words: ‘’Bounded rationality is simply the idea that the choices people make are 
determined not only by some consistent overall goal and the properties of the external world, 
but also by the knowledge that decision makers do and don't have of the world, their ability or 
inability to evoke that knowledge when it is relevant…and to adjudicate among their many 
competing wants. Rationality is bounded because these abilities are severely limited.’’ (Simon, 
2000: 25) Thus, the theory describes how individuals and institutions actually make decisions 
compared to the economic theories of maximizing expected utility and that humans are 
perfectly rational agents (Simon, 1989). 
For an alternative to the utility maximization and rational agent theory, Simon suggested 
specific decision-making heuristic called satisficing: humans are bound to decrease cognitive 
effort since their mental capabilities are limited. Since mental effort takes resources, humans 
might opt for the first suitable solution (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). The concept can be reflected 
well from Simon’s own motivation of picking economics as his major: ‘’I simply picked the 
first profession that sounded fascinating’’ (Simon, 1978: 1). After the initial discovery of 
satisficing, economist and psychologist are now well aware of the unrealistic assumptions 
behind rational choice theory (see e.g., J.  Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1986; Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011) 
Today, a significant amount of research has been made on the different human heuristics in 
their everyday life. Both formal models with mathematical equations (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011) as well as more qualitative research (Kahneman, 2011) has been made. It 
must be stated that bounded rationality or heuristics are not automatically about human failure: 
they can clarify how and when people can use less information and similarly make good 
decisions (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). Next, I will present selected behavioral finance theory 
and how current crowdfunding literature relates to it. 
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3.4.2. Peer pressure 
An army of sheep led by a lion is better than an army of lions led by a sheep 
- Alexander the Great 
Like Alexander the Great proposed, it often takes only a small number of courageous people 
for society to function correctly. Whether or not Kahneman and Tversky (1974) knew the quote, 
one of the first significant heuristics they proposed is the anchoring effect: a bias triggered by 
insufficient changes because final decisions are adapted toward the anchor’s thoughts (Furnham 
& Boo, 2010). In crowdfunding, the image of the project can be enhanced in the eyes of non-
expert investors by having few anchor venture capitalists investing considerable sums to the 
campaign (Vulkan et al., 2016). Business angels or venture capitalists with more experience are 
better equipped to identify profitable businesses at very early stage thus offering a credible 
certification for possible future success. 
 
The effect comes even more transparent in a crowdfunding platform where a success metrics is 
present. By enabling the rate of funding the project has reached to be seen, the crowd can 
evaluate the progress and how likely is it for a campaign to be successfully funded. The 
consequence arising from this anchor is the mimicking of others’ behavior (herding): those 
projects that get funding early on, and seem to reach the funding goal, attract even more 
investments from the crowd (Agrawal et al., 2014). This finding was backed by Kim and 
Viswanathan (2018) who discovered that early investments by experts in the beginning of the 
campaign channel positive signals to the crowd and encourage following funding. 
 
However, the herding behavior might have negative consequences: people may possess quality 
information concerning an investment opportunity, but after they have noticed an experienced 
investor acting contrary to their opinion, the knowledge is neglected. People ignore the evidence 
of their own senses due to peer pressure and the desire not to face the disapproval of the group 
(Asch, 1952). In the crowdfunding context, Moritz et al. (2015) find that investors seem to 
reevaluate or even ignore their own assessments following third-party endorsements.  
Consequently, many groups give in to a habit of collective conservatism: the attachment of 
crowds to stick to collective past choices even as new needs arise (Kuran, 1987).   
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3.4.3. Priming effects 
When you get that signing bonus, do not start thinking about all the things you can do with $1 
million. 
- David Robinson, of the NBA’s San Antonio Spurs 
The second heuristic Kahneman and Tversky (1974) initially proposed is the availability 
heuristic or in other words how people evaluate the likelihood of events and risk ‘’by the ease 
with which instances or associations come to mind’’. For instance, personal experiences in 
product failure will be associated with similar instances in the future easier than when reading 
them from the news. Consequently, companies are nowadays making every effort to increase 
purchases by decreasing service deficiencies and developing brands that are identifiable.  
One aspect affecting the availability heuristic and how people end up using their money in the 
first place is the effect of mental accounting. Mental accounting is the set of cognitive 
operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial 
activities (Thaler, 1999). It provides a groundwork for the way in which people set reference 
points for the accounts that determine gains and losses. For example, households designate 
different accounts for various uses such as grocery shopping, rent, investment decisions, 
insurance bills, vacations and so forth. 
What happens to mental accounting if something unexpected happens? From a normative 
standpoint, tax refunds, gifts of money and income from all other sources should be spent 
similarly. However, research has shown that those who are given unanticipated money tend to 
spend it more readily (Arkes et al., 1994). Thaler and Sunstein (2008) continued the discussion 
by hypothesizing that people are more likely to splurge impulsively on a big luxury purchase 
when they have received an unexpected bonus than with savings that they have accumulated 
over time.  
Additional aspect touching availability heuristic is vividness. For instance, it has been found 
that images of losses that evoke vivid negative mental imagery lead to a greater willingness to 
purchase insurance (Johnson et al., 1993). In crowdfunding, vivid language (Gorbatai & Nelson 
2015) and the use of video material (Virtala, 2017) has been discovered to increase funding 
success. 
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3.4.3. Information effects 
I have had a hot hand since I was born. 
– Michael Beasley,  of  the  NBA's  New York Knicks  
The third original heuristic of Kahneman and Tversky (1974), the representativeness bias, is a 
base for people to confuse fluctuations with causal patterns. For example, the ‘hot hand' in 
basketball – where fans think that a player is more likely to make his next shot if he has 
succeeded in his last shot – has been considered only a myth. According to research, players 
are actually a bit less likely to make their next shot, and people have trouble to differentiate 
mere randomness and streak shooting (Vallone & Tversky, 1985; Tversky & Gilovich, 1989).  
Setting basketball aside, in finance, representativeness bias is often demonstrated by the 
tendency of people buying stocks that have performed well in the past. Investors appear to 
believe that past returns are indicative of future returns, although, after a long bull market, index 
decline is more likely than a continued upward movement (De Bondt & Thaler, 1989). Again, 
people confuse randomness with causal patterns. 
Linking the representativeness to crowdfunding, Lukkarinen et al. (2016) discovered that, 
companies offering B2C products or services, rather than B2B, are more successful. The crowd 
might be more accustomed to companies that offer familiar products and think of them as more 
successful as they use them more often. The same applies to different industry categories. For 
instance, in Kickstarter, artistic projects have been found to achieve their campaign target more 
often than their technological peers (Marom & Sade, 2013).  Technology might be complicated 
for crowds to understand and thus affect the probability to reach the goal. The uncertain results 
in inertia and people move towards the known. This could also be seen as the status quo bias: 
individuals select one of a known set of choices with specific outcomes (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988). Examples of this can be seen all around our society: students tend to sit in 
the same seats in the class, consumers go to the same grocery store and in the case of 
crowdfunding, the investor might participate in similar campaigns she is previously 
accustomed.  
The uncertain might affect people’s decisions in the crowdfunding context also in regards to 
the campaign duration. Research on decision-making has shown that people are heavily biased 
towards the present (e.g., Thaler 1981; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) arising from the fact that 
human beings, possibly as a result of biological evolution, are impatient by nature (Robson & 
Samuelsson, 2008).  However, the heuristic of leaning towards present is not necessarily a 
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failure of human nature: in general, people should prefer receiving money immediately rather 
than later since future outcomes are discounted (time discounting) (Chen et al., 2005). In fact, 
there have been studies in the crowdfunding literature demonstrating that the projects 
successfully reaching the funding goal have shorter durations (Mollick, 2014). People might be 
reluctant to give their money for campaigns that have long durations, as there is a possibility 
for campaign failure and the money could be at the same time earning interest.  
 
Figure 4: Framework for behavioral heuristics 
The research uses bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) as the umbrella concept to study why 
overfunding occurs. Additionally, several heuristics are presented to explain the complex 
phenomena 
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4. Data & Methodology 
The following chapter splits into two parts. First, the data of this report is presented while the 
benefits pf isomg Invesdor’s data is discussed. Second, I describe the methodology, which will 
determine the course of this report for the second half of this study.  
 
4.1. Data sample 
In this research, data is provided by Invesdor Oy, a dominant equity crowdfunding platform in 
the Nordic countries (Lukkarinen et al., 2016: 6). The information encompasses 185 campaigns 
from the opening of the platform in 2012 up till September 2017. The provided data covers 
information about the basic characteristics of the companies, the starting and ending date of the 
campaign, the declared investment target, the amount of external investments and the activity 
in the campaign site during the funding round and the facts about the final success of the 
campaign. Due to the nature of the research, debt-based campaigns and IPOs have been cleared 
from the data, which have been offered in Invesdor by few campaigns during the life of the 
platform. The market context of the study and the Invesdor platform is next presented. 
 
Invesdor works with ‘’all or nothing’’ design, where the creators acquire the total amount 
pledged by investors only if the specified goal has been reached at the end of the campaign 
period. It follows that funders’ money is transferred only after the successful round to the 
company. However, the campaigns can exceed the initial target by large margins as the 
maximum amount can differ extensively from the original goal: after a project has reached its 
target, it can continue to receive financing until the closing date. As of September 2017, the 
platform had hosted 185 equity crowdfunding campaigns of which 81 had been successful 
leading to a total amount of over €46 million invested in companies. Most of the ventures 
seeking funding in Invesdor are Finnish, but also Swedish, Danish, Estonian, Norwegian and 
British companies have found their way to the platform. 
 
Due to the crowdfunding developments in Finland, three fruitful reasons to use data from 
Invesdor can be found: Firstly, the regulative landscape of equity crowdfunding allowed 
unaccredited investors to invest in campaigns several years ago and further developments have 
ensured the acceleration of campaign volumes (Finnish State Council, 2016; VM, 2016). 
Secondly, Invesdor has strengthened its international presence and listed campaigns not only in 
Finland but also in other Nordic countries and the United Kingdom (Lukkarinen et al., 2016; 
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Virtala, 2017). Thus, the findings from the Finnish sample might give implications on how 
equity crowdfunding behaves as countries allow unaccredited investors to participate in the 
future funding rounds. Lastly, as we will see later, there has been a considerable amount of 
overfunded projects in the Invesdor platform, making it fruitful for us to look at the drivers 
associated with overfunding.  
 
4.2. Methodology 
The study utilizes both exploratory design and quantitative methods to explore the research 
questions. Firstly, as the phenomena of overfunding in equity crowdfunding is without 
comprehensive previous studies, I use explanatory research to lay the groundwork for the 
study’s hypotheses and for upcoming research to identify issues that could be concentrated on 
in the future. Explorative research has been found to shed light on a phenomena that has been 
previously explored only fractionally and thus, could bring order to connections and causal 
mechanisms among researchers (Reiter, 2017). Secondly, as explorative studies may be subject 
to bias, I use quantitative data to assist in the interpretation and generalization of final 
information. The way of mixing both approaches together is called as sequential exploratory 
strategy (Creswell, 1996): first a new theoretical topic is described and explored with thoughtful 
literature review and hypothesis building, and then the constructed framework design is 
followed by quantitative analysis. 
Based on the methodology, the next chapters are constructed as follows: firstly, the research 
will construct four hypotheses forms to investigate overfunding, based on the literature 
framework of entrepreneurial finance and group heuristics. These are the campaign conditions, 
project information disclosure, external campaign context and project segmentation. The 
variables used in these hypothesis forms to construct an overall picture of overfunding are: 
funding goal, project duration, minimum investment, video-base information, forum posts, pitch 
updates, hot market issue, December timing, external investments, and campaign industry, 
stage and year. The variables originate from the data Invesdor has provided for the research. 
 
Secondly, as the research is focused on overfunding, the absolute amount of funding is not taken 
into consideration. Instead, a ratio of finally reached funding X and the initially defined funding 
goal Xgoal will be used following the example of Koch (2016). Thus, Rfund = X / Xgoal. It 
follows that the projects which do not meet the funding target, Rfund extents in the interval of 
[0, 1], while successful projects always have a Rfund ≥ 1. The project is defined to be 
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overfunded if Rfund > 1. It follows that the more overfunded the project gets, the higher the 
degree of the ratio. 
 
Thirdly, an initial examination of the data is done by descriptive statistics and univariate 
analysis. First, the variable definitions are provided for better understanding of what is 
measured. After, the distribution of campaign success by individual campaigns, project 
industries, company stages and yearly campaign development are displayed to demonstrate the 
frequency of overfunding. Lastly, I will evaluate with univariate analysis how different 
variables are related to each other. Correlation matrix and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are 
executed. However, as the univariate analysis does not provide a clear picture of the influence 
mechanism, I will perform a regression analysis as the next step. 
 
The percentage raised is analyzed with an OLS regression, following existing studies (Vulkan 
et al., 2016 Cordova et al., 2015). Additionally, similarly to Virtala (2017), ordinal logistic 
regression will be performed as an additional robustness check. In the analysis, four segments 
are constructed and the projects that have reached over 150% of the initial target goal will be 
compared to other campaigns. Afterward, the results are analyzed and then mirrored to previous 
literature, along with the possible heuristics behind outcomes.  Lastly, I will assess the 
credibility of the findings. 
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5. Hypotheses 
The study analyzes campaign overfunding and associated behavioral heuristics with the 
following questions: 
 
RQ1: What are the key drivers of overfunding in online equity crowdfunding? 
RQ2: What are the critical crowd heuristics, which contribute to a campaign to be 
overfunded? 
 
To reach an overall conclusion to the research questions, multiple aspects must be addressed. 
Therefore, a framework by Koch from the reward-based context is applied (Figure 5). The 
framework gives clarity and a better overview of overfunding and four hypothesis forms has 
been structured. However, contrary to the original framework, some different variables are used 
deriving from the behavioral heuristics framework and for better suitability to equity-based 
crowdfunding. The variables in the model, how they originate from the literature review as well 
as their possible effect on the direction of overfunding, will be now discussed. 
Campaign Conditions: Reward-based crowdfunding study by Cordova et al. (2015) 
demonstrated that a higher amount of funding requested by the founder is associated with a 
lower overfunding. As the target is set higher, it is unlikely for the project to be overfunded as 
it is difficult for the campaign even to reach its funding goal. Also from a mental accounting 
standpoint, people might not have high amounts of extra money waiting for a crowdfunding 
campaign, as excess funds are already allocated to some other activities. Thus, an assumption 
is made that:  
H1.1: The funding goal and project overfunding are negatively related.  
Duration is another critical characteristic in a crowdfunding campaign. Previous research has 
found differing results in its effect on project outcomes. Burtch et al. (2013) report that 
increasing the time of the campaign builds attention among the audience thus leading to a 
desired project result. Koch's (2016) overfunding study is in line with the finding: more 
extended funding periods of successfully funded campaigns are associated with stronger 
overfunding. However, Mollick (2014) discovered that several campaigns which thrive to reach 
their target have shorter durations. The IPO literature has supported this view from time 
discounting perspective: Guo and Brooks (2009) identified that companies should decrease the 
31 
 
 
duration of the issue, as investors evaluate the possible downsides and choose issues with a 
shorter duration to decrease their costs of financing. It follows that: 
H1.2: Longer funding duration is associated with reduced overfunding. 
The third base characteristic of a crowdfunding project is the minimum investment required 
from an investor to take part in an individual campaign. Lukkarinen et al. (2016) report that the 
minimum investment has a strong negative relationship with the number of investors and with 
the amount raised. Brennan and Franks (1997) back the finding by discovering that IPO over-
subscriptions are negatively correlated with the level of issue price. The higher the minimum 
investment, the more unwilling the individual investor might be to invest as the risk of losing 
more substantial amounts of money increases: 
H1.3: Higher minimum investment is associated with reduced overfunding. 
 
Project Information Disclosure: Scholars argue that setting up video material to the campaign 
site has supportive effects on reaching the funding goal. They enhance the saliency of facts and 
understandability of crowdfunding campaigns, thus having a positive influence on the outcome 
(Virtala, 2017). Thus, it is assumed that adding a video to the campaign website to have a 
positive influence on overfunding as well, increasing the vividness of the campaign: 
H2.1: Adding a video to the campaign website is associated with overfunding.  
Koch (2016) reports that if founders communicate in a reward-based crowdfunding platform 
actively, it will lead to a stronger overfunding. The communication might act as a positive signal 
of project transparency. Additionally, Moritz et al. (2015) identify that the communication 
between peers and additional experienced investors influence the decision-making process of 
individual investors.  Hence, it is assumed that the more forum posts and updates a campaign 
has, the stronger is the overfunding in equity-based crowdfunding. The hypotheses is based also 
on herding behavior, collective conservatism and satisficing as signals between investors have 
been found to affect crowds’ decision-making process (Moritz, 2015): 
H2.2: The amount of forum post to campaign site and overfunding are positively associated. 
H2.3: The amount of updates to a pitch and overfunding are positively associated. 
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External campaign context: Platform operators’ own earnings are dependable on successful 
campaigns (Agrawal et al., 2013). Thus, crowdfunding platforms have a motivation to add as 
many projects as they can to their website and support those that succeed. Furthermore, periods 
with high amount of IPOs have been related with increased amount of enthusiasm among people 
and companies benefit from markets’ positive sentiment (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003). 
However, placing too many campaigns at the same time might thus hurt individual project 
funding. Benveniste et al. (2003) document that as the quantity of enterprises going public 
concurrently increases, the more significant the amount of underpricing. Companies should thus 
schedule their IPO to occur during a time with low volume of offerings. From this baseline, it 
is conjectured that: 
H3.1:  Campaign volume (hot market issue) and overfunding are negatively associated 
The platform operators might do alternative timing procedures to increase the likelihood of a 
campaign to be successful. For instance, in Finland, tax refunds to Finnish people are paid in 
December (Finnish Tax, 2018). It could be then hypothesized that timing your project 
somewhere around December might act as a catapult for project success as people have excess 
money. Like Arkens et al. (1994) discovered, those who are given unanticipated money, are 
more likely to spend it more readily as people tend to do mental accounting. Thus, I hypothesize 
that: 
H3.2: Timing the project to be scheduled in Finland during December and overfunding are 
positively associated 
Similar to every campaign in the Invesdor platform is the success metrics, which presents the 
rate of funding the project has reached. With the metrics, the crowd can evaluate the progress 
and how likely is it for a campaign to be successfully funded. One possible consequence arising 
from this metric is the mimicking of others’ behavior (herding): those projects that get funding 
early on, and seem to reach the funding goal, attract even more funding from the crowd 
(Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2013). In addition, as the funders could see that professional investors 
trust the project, it signals as a trustworthy anchor for the campaign. Using a dummy variable 
of 1 if a campaign has external investors, Virtala (2017) reports that external investments were 
associated with higher percentage funding in equity-based crowdfunding. Although the present 
report does not use dummy variable but rather a percentage of funding by VCs of the initial 
target, I hypothesis that:  
H3.3:  External investments and overfunding are positively associated. 
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Project segmentation: Lukkarinen et al. (2016) reported that in Invesdor, companies offering 
B2C products or services, rather than B2B, are more successful. B2C companies might draw 
extra media attention in months before funding round due date, as has been seen in the IPO 
context (Demers & Lewellen, 2003). Additionally, the crowd might be more used to products 
they have earlier experience (status quo bias), but are now just offered with a different business 
model: 
H4.1: B2B companies are negatively associated with overfunding compared to B2C companies.  
Moreover, it is assumed that there exist differences in funding behavior between project 
categories. For instance, artistic projects have been reported to achieve their campaign target 
more often than their technological peers (Marom & Sade, 2013).Technology might be 
complicated for crowds to understand and thus affect the probability to reach the goal. 
Additionally, venture capital literature supports the notion as it is common for professional 
investors to specialize in certain industries (Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993). Thus, I will 
hypothesize that: 
H4.2: Certain industry categories tend to be more overfunded. 
In addition, the company’s stage is added as an independent characteristic. Previous research 
in equity-crowdfunding has indicated that more developed companies reach the funding target 
more frequently than the ones in seed stages (Virtala, 2017). The anchoring heuristic and 
crowds’ habit to follow expert investors might favor for later stage companies seeking 
crowdfunding: venture capitalists have a tendency to invest in more mature companies and the 
effect is even more pronounced in economic down cycles (Freear et al., 2002; Block & Sandner, 
2009). However,  in the IPO context, Tajuddin (2015) report that company size has a negative 
relationship between over-subscription since big companies are considered to offer lower initial 
returns due to low risk and information asymmetry. Thus the hypothesis is that:  
H4.3: Certain stage categories are associated with overfunding. 
It is most probable that economic down cycles not only affect the funding of different maturity 
companies but also have an impact to the overall overfunding level year-by-year. After the 
financial crisis in 2007 the global economy has recovered significantly as the current decade of 
2010s gets closer to the end. At the same time, crowdfunding as a phenomena has become more 
popular among the general public and money is flowing into the projects in increasing amounts 
(Massolution, 2015). As people hear about the successful campaigns through word-of-mouth 
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and marketing efforts, also the overfunding phenomena might become more pronounced. Due 
to the growing interest in crowdfunding and the data restriction from projects between 2012 
and 2017, I hypothesize that: 
H4.4: Between the five year period of 2012 to 2017, the most recent years are positively 
associated with overfunding 
 
Figure 5: Hypothesis framework 
Summary of the hypotheses and their expected influence on project overfunding in equity crowdfunding. 
The framework follows the example of Koch (2016): 
 
 
 
The final research model (Figure 4), takes influence from previous research on overfunding in 
reward-based crowdfunding and IPO subscriptions, earlier findings of the success factors in 
equity-based crowdfunding as well as the human heuristics suggested by earlier finance 
literature. It has been modified from the initial framework of Koch (2016) to match the unique 
characteristic of equity-based crowdfunding and to study further the crowd behaviors related to 
overfunding. The first hypotheses forms concerning campaign conditions and project 
information disclosure, are constructed from previous research on entrepreneurial finance, 
which has reported that several variables determine the success of individual campaign  The 
hypotheses in the third subcategory – external campaign context – is formed from preceding 
research mainly in behavioral economics and IPOs. Moreover, equity crowdfunding research 
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in the Scandinavian countries (see Lukkarinen et al., 2016; Virtala, 2017) is extended 
concerning the project segmentation although the hypothesis based on yearly overfunding did 
not occur in neither report.  The ratio of finally reached funding X and the initially defined 
funding goal Xgoal will be used as the main dependable variable to reflect overfunding. 
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6. Empirical findings and discussion 
6.1. Variable definitions 
The discussed dependent variable overfunding and all the independent variables originating 
from the constructed hypotheses are presented in Table 1. The independent variables are also 
marked by their own hypothesis forms for better readability. 
 
What comes to the campaign conditions and the subsequent funding goal, duration and 
minimum investment, the variables naturally vary depending on the campaign. The platform 
operators and company founders will discuss the conditions case by case before launching the 
individual campaign for the investors to see. Following previous studies, the funding goal is 
projected by log transformation due to the highly skewed values (Mollick, 2014; Kuppuswamy 
& Bayus 2013) 
 
From the project information disclosure, forum posts and pitch updates can have a range of 
values. However, the provision of video material in the campaign site is treated with a dummy 
variable: 1 if a campaign has a video and 0 otherwise. 
 
What comes to the external campaign context and hot market issue, the example is taken from 
Low and Yong (2011) in the IPO over-subscription phenomenon: dummy variable equals 1 if 
the IPO end date is in a month in which number of IPOs in that month is above the median, or 
zero otherwise. I will thus calculate the hot issue market in crowdfunding with a dummy 
variable of 1 if the campaign ends in a month that has more than the median amount of projects 
ending in a given month, and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, December timing is treated with 
dummy variable 1 if the campaign is taking place anytime during December. This way, an 
investor can use her excess money to a crowdfunding campaign but at the same time, I assume 
that the mental accounting effect is finished by the end of the month, as Christmas shopping 
and holidays have taken place. Lastly, external investments is a percentage of the campaign 
target, as the rate of  the funding metric in Invesdor platform will act as an anchor to lure 
additional investors to the campaign. The metric differentiates from Virtala (2017) who used 
dummy variable of 1 if a campaign had external investors. 
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Finally, all of the project segmentation variables (B2B vs. B2C, Industry category, stage 
category and year category) will be treated with a dummy variable as they can be categorized 
into their own buckets. 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variable  
  
Overfunding 
The total amount raised from the crowdfunding platform 
divided by the initial campaign target Rfund = X / Xgoal 
  
Independent Variables  
Campaign conditions  
H1.1 Ln funding goal 
The natural logarithm of the initial campaign target requested 
by the founder 
H1.2 Funding duration 
The length of the campaign in the crowdfunding platform from 
its starting date to the closing date 
H1.3 Minimum investment 
The minimum investment required from an individual investor 
to take part in the campaign 
Project information disclosure  
H2.1 Video 
The provision of video material at the campaign site. Dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if a campaign has a video and 0 
otherwise 
H2.2 Forum posts 
The number of forum posts by the founder or investors in the 
campaign site 
H2.3 Pitch updates The number of changes a founder makes in the campaign 
platform to the campaign pitch 
External campaign context  
H3.1 Hot market issue 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the campaign ends in a 
month that has more than the median amount of projects ending 
in a given month, and 0 otherwise 
H3.2 December timing 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the campaign is visible for 
investors in the platform during December, and 0 otherwise 
H3.3 External investments 
The external transactions (%) by VCs, angel investors or family 
and friends of the minimum campaign target requested by the 
founder 
Project Segmentation  
H4.1 B2B vs. B2C 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company is a B2B 
provider and 0 if B2C 
H4.2 Industry category 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company is part of a 
specific category and 0 otherwise 
H4.3 Stage category 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company is part of a 
specific stage and 0 otherwise 
H4.4 Year category 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 when a campaign is ending 
in a specific year between 2012-2017 and 0 otherwise 
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6.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the distribution of project success. There are a considerable amount of projects 
that are within the 0-50% range of the initial target, indicating that campaigns, which are 
unsuccessful, do it with a large margin. This is supported by the fact that only few projects end 
up in the 50%-100% range. The remark is consistent with earlier studies made in the reward-
based crowdfunding platform Kickstarter (Koch, 2018; Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2013). 
However, the quantity of projects exceeding the target is considerable: 81 out of 185 campaigns 
(43,8%) go beyond the 100% threshold and 23 projects (12,4%) even exceed 200% of the initial 
funding goal. The observation proves that overfunding is not a one-time occurring instance in 
equity-based crowdfunding. Additionally, percentage-wise it seems that more campaigns are 
surpassing the initial goal with a large margin in equity crowdfunding than in reward-based 
crowdfunding: Koch (2018) reported that only 5,6% of campaigns exceed the 200% mark in 
Kickstarter. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of project success 
The table displays the distribution of project success. The information extends from 2012 to September 
2017, addressing 185 equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
 
 
 
Next, Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the independent 
variables: 
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Table 3: Variable summary statistics 
The table displays the summary statistics of the dependent variable and independent variables. The data 
covers information from 2012 to September 2017, addressing 185 equity crowdfunding campaigns. See 
Table 1 for variable definitions. 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Dependent Variable         
Overfunding 0,00 10,08 1,02 1,35 
Independent Variables         
Campaign conditions         
H1.1 ln funding goal 20 000,00 6 000 000,00 258 899,52 622 102,14 
H1.2 Funding duration 12,00 232,00 78,77 35,71 
H1.3 Minimum investment 0,00 10 125,00 649,73 1 391,73 
Project information disclosure         
H2.1 Video 0,00 1,00 0,58 0,50 
H2.2 Forum posts 0,00 75,00 11,52 15,97 
H2.3 Pitch updates 0,00 15,00 1,56 2,14 
External campaign context         
H3.1 Hot market issue 0,00 1,00 0,62 0,49 
H3.2 December timing 0,00 1,00 0,24 0,43 
H3.3 External investments (%) 0,00 6,40 0,18 0,61 
Project Segmentation         
H4.1 B2B vs B2C 0,00 1,00 0,42 0,49 
          
 
The table reinforces our earlier observation that some campaigns have not been able to collect 
any funding while the maximum amount can exceed the initial goal by a significant margin. 
However, the mean of the dependent variable overfunding is at 1,02 indicating that the central 
tendency of the campaigns is close to the funding goal. 
 
From the independent variables, it is easy to see that the funding goal ranges from tens of 
thousands to several million, although most campaigns seek for funding somewhere in between. 
The minimum investment can be thousands of euros, meaning that for an ordinary investor the 
amount can get quite high. 
 
From the project information disclosure, it can be noticed that more than half of the projects 
have had a video in the platform, although a considerable amount has decided not to include 
one. Additionally, the maximum forum posts is 75 while the mean is over 10, indicating that 
several campaigns are attracting discussion and can carry the conversation to their campaign 
site. The mean of pitch updates is low, demonstrating that founders have often done everything 
they want before the campaign and do not wish to do any updates. 
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From platform related aspects, it is natural that the mean of the hot market issue is closer to 1 
than 0, as the months which have more than the median amount of projects ending in a given 
month will receive a dummy variable of 1. The months exceeding the median are May, June, 
August, October, November and December. In addition, External investments can be substantial 
in some cases and exceed the funding goal significantly, although the mean is set to 18% in all 
of the projects.  
 
Table 4: Projects ending in a given month 
The table displays the number of projects ending in a given month. The median amount is 14.5. The data 
covers information from 2012 to September 2017, addressing 185 equity crowdfunding campaigns. See 
Table 1 for variable definitions. 
        
  H 3.1 Hot market issue   
  Month Projects Ending   
  January 11   
  February 9   
  March 14   
  April 13   
  May 19   
  June 26   
  July 13   
  August 18   
  September 11   
  October 15   
  November 15   
  December 21   
  Total 185   
 
 
Lastly, project segmentation illustrates that there are more B2C companies than B2B, indicating 
that consumer service or product oriented companies have found their way more often to the 
platform As the company founders establish their presence in Invesdor, they are required to fill 
out their company stage and the industry classification. There are 19 different industry 
classifications the company can choose from and three company stages. Virtala (2017), using 
Invesdor’s data, separated the categories only to find that most industries have been represented 
by just few projects in the platform making the effect of the field difficult to interpret. However, 
a clear pattern of the company's development stage was visible e.g., seed, growth, early; the 
more advanced the company, the higher the percentage raised and the number of investments. 
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For this research, industry categories and development stages are done to double check the 
answers with an ampler data.  The descriptive statistics of the company category and stage are 
provided in the following tables: 
   
Table 5: Key figures by industry category and company stage 
The table displays the critical figures by industry and stage category: the percentage funding, capital 
subscriptions and the average number of investors. The data covers information from 2012 to September 
2017, addressing 185 equity crowdfunding campaigns. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
H4.2 Industry Category
Successful 
rounds
Average 
percentual 
funding
Sum of 
capital 
subscribed
Min of 
capital 
subscribed
Max of 
capital 
subscribed
Average of 
number of 
investors
Art and Design 2 0,82 80 480 1 280 79 200 22
Biotechnology 1 1,14 136 544 136 544 136 544 80
Consumer products 16 1,17 4 625 782 0 1 457 850 49
E-Commerce 2 0,92 1 458 244 711 146 747 098 32
Education 3 1,85 1 259 006 5 826 1 220 000 219
Environmental and Ethical 5 0,59 1 483 875 300 1 302 941 49
Film, TV and Theatre 2 2,70 269 600 3 800 265 800 221
Food and Drink 19 0,88 3 123 101 700 980 294 99
Health & Fitness 9 1,08 834 663 12 400 187 525 52
Internet Business 20 0,68 2 664 018 0 1 240 485 24
IT and Telecommunications 12 1,05 3 178 080 0 1 671 975 37
Leisure and Tourism 3 0,73 881 561 26 924 810 800 119
Manufacturing 4 0,66 497 004 1 500 229 104 41
Media and Creative services 9 0,59 705 647 0 363 000 195
Other 12 1,47 2 189 129 711 1 008 385 56
Professional &Business Serv. 13 1,54 4 529 526 0 1 224 210 94
Retail 4 0,46 90 112 250 50 000 11
Sport and Leisure 11 1,14 3 321 585 8 500 1 117 600 330
Technology 38 0,95 14 790 322 0 6 398 385 47
Grand Total 185 1,02 46 118 281 0 6 398 385 82  
H4.3 Company 
stage
Count of 
successful
Average 
percentual 
funding
Sum of capital 
subscribed
Min of capital 
subscribed
Max of capital 
subscribed
Average 
number of 
investors
Early 29 1,21 18 581 065 5800 6 398 385 78
Growth 25 1,78 13 317 079 250 1 240 485 300
Seed 131 0,83 14 220 137 0 1 653 360 42
Grand Total 185 1,02 46 118 281 0 6 398 385 82  
 
In the table, industry categories are specified horizontally on the right-hand side. It becomes 
clear that most of the industry categories have had only few successful campaigns in the 
Invesdor platform, making statistical significances challenging to interpret. Only 8 out of the 
19 industry categories have had more than 10 successful projects, technology being the most 
pronounced with 38 campaigns. What comes to overfunding, the average percentual funding in 
Film, TV and Theatre category, as well as Education is high, although they have had only a few 
successful rounds in the platform. These fields of businesses are followed by Professional and 
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Business Services and the category Other, which also have more observation points. Sport and 
Leisure, Media and Creative Services, Film, TV and Theatre, and Education seem to attract the 
most traffic regarding the average number of investors in individual campaigns. 
   
From the stage categories, the table demonstrates that growth stage companies are more likely 
to be clearly overfunded compared to their peers. The number of investors is also higher in this 
company stage class. However, the largest companies in terms of revenue, the early stage 
companies, have been able to collect most funding in terms of the jointly subscribed total 
capital. The most unrefined companies, seed stage ventures, have been on average under-
subscribed 
 
Lastly, the project success as a percentage is broken down to the years between 2012 and 2017, 
to examine how the funding has developed over time. None of the previous researches which 
the present report takes most influence (Koch, 2016; Virtala, 2017; Lukkarinen et al., 2016) 
took this into consideration. The campaigns have been categorized by their ending year:  
 
 
Table 6: Overfunding yearly development 
The table displays the yearly distribution of project success by project ending year. The data covers 
information from 2012 to September 2017, addressing 185 equity crowdfunding campaigns.  
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When the Invesdor platform started to operate in May 2012, there were only 8 projects during 
the year. From the campaigns, 6 ended up in the first segment of 0%-25% of funding goal 
achieved. This might be due to the platform’s early problems: they had not learned the best 
practices to promote campaigns. The initial difficulties seemed to proceed in the next two years 
as considerable amount of campaigns ended up in the 0%-25% category in 2013 and 2014 as 
well. However, when time passed by, the percent of funding goal achieved increases: during 
2015 to 2017 a significant volume reaches the 100% and even 150% threshold. During 2017 
this is even more notable, as the data finishes in September. Table 7 provides a summary of the 
yearly development: 
 
 
Table 7: Key figures of the yearly development of overfunding 
The table displays the critical figures by year category: the percentage funding, capital subscriptions and 
the average number of investors. The data covers information from 2012 to September 2017, addressing 
185 equity crowdfunding campaigns. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
As could be seen from the graph already, funding seems to increase over time from 2012 to 
2017. From the 7 it is evident that 1) the amount of successful campaigns, 2) the average 
percentage funding 3) the sum of capital subscribed and 4) the average number of investors all 
increase in 2015-2017 compared to 2012-2013. From this point, it is fascinating to continue to 
the correlation and regression analysis of the overfunding phenomena. 
 
 
H4.4 Year 
category
Count of 
successful
Average 
percentual 
funding
Sum of 
capital 
subscribed
Max of 
capital 
subscribed
Average 
number of 
investors
2012 8 0,49 160 882 100 015 4
2013 30 0,55 1 784 056 658 950 16
2014 33 0,91 1 927 233 290 871 41
2015 35 1,34 6 146 563 1 008 385 152
2016 41 0,97 21 803 687 6 398 385 118
2017 38 1,34 14 295 860 1 653 360 83
Grand Total 185 1,02 46 118 281 6 398 385 82
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6.4. Correlation matrix & VIF scores 
As a first step, a correlation matrix is formed to examine the bivariate correlation of the 
variables to the overfunding ratio. As the correlation coefficient value goes towards 0, the 
relationship between the two variables will be weaker. The different correlation coefficients 
also give a preliminary view if there are any positive or negative relationships between the 
different variables. However, it is not applicable to interpret that changes in one variable cause 
changes in another based on correlation alone. 
 
Secondly, I review the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores to examine the unique and shared 
contributions (multicollinearity) of the variables to the overfunding ratio. According to a 
general rule by Gefen et al. (2000), VIF score should not exceed 10, or otherwise 
multicollinearity is likely to be present and affecting the results of regression. However, even 
stricter rule by Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006) states that the VIF score should be under 
3.3. 
 
The correlation matrix can be found from the next page in Table 8. The results indicate that 
four variables correlate with the overfunding ratio with a similar effect as I previously 
hypothesized. The funding duration has an apparent adverse effect, meaning that the longer the 
duration, the less overfunding will be gained. On the other hand, three variables have a positive 
effect: adding a video, many forum posts and obtaining external transactions from venture 
capitalists or family and friends, will make the campaign likely to be overfunded. 
 
Oppositely, there were six variables that do not show a significant effect on the overfunding 
ratio: funding goal, minimum investment, pitch updates, hot market issue, December timing and 
B2B vs. B2C. In addition, in this preliminary analysis, three of the variables have a different 
relationship between overfunding than I initially hypothesized: minimum investment seems to 
have a positive relationship while pitch updates and December timing have a slightly negative 
relationship.  
 
As I proceed to the regression analysis in the following chapter, it is reassuring to realize that 
the correlation coefficients are plotted quite close to 0, indicating a weak relationship between 
the different variables. Additionally, the multicollinearity is tested with the VIF score. The 
number always ranges between 1 and 2, meaning that multicollinearity is not likely to be present 
and affecting the results (Gefen, 2000; Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006). 
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Table 8: Correlation matrix & VIF scores 
The table displays the correlation matrix (Pearson correlation) and VIF scores for the dependent variable 
overfunding and all of the independent variables. The sample ranges from May 2012 to September 2017, 
covering 185 equity crowdfunding campaigns. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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6.5. OLS regression 
Next, OLS regression is used to examine the hypothesized relationships to overfunding. To 
increase the validity of the results, the individual independent variables were first controlled to 
the dependable variable overfunding alone, and afterward they were all measured together. 
Table 9 presents the relationship results in the form of OLS regression output: 
 
 
Table 9: OLS regression 
The table displays the OLS regression for the dependent variable overfunding. The individual independent 
variables are first controlled to the dependable variable overfunding alone, and afterward they are all 
measured together. The sample ranges from May 2012 to September 2017, covering 185 equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. The table reports the standardized coefficients beta and coefficient p-value 
significance in parenthesis (2-tailed):* p<0.1,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. From industry variables, only the ones 
with significance in either model are presented. See Table 1 for variable definitions and Appendix B for p-
value significances in all of the regression models.   
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Overfunding Variables
H1.1 ln funding goal 0.015 -0.350***
(0.842) (0.001)
H1.2 Funding duration -0.220 ** -0.175 **
(0.050) (0.017)
H1.3 Minimum investment 0.067 0.129*
(0.362) (0.097)
H2.1 Video 0.166 ** 0.003
(0.024) (0.968)
H2.2 Forum posts 0.454 *** 0.541 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
H2.3 Pitch updates -0.013 0.003
(0.856) (0.968)
H3.1 Hot market Issue -0.04 -0.045
(0.586) (0.574)
H3.2 December timing -0.015 0.056
(0.846) (0.427)
H3.3 External investments 0.355*** 0.353 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
H4.1 B2B vs. B2C -0.076 0.021
(0.306) (0.806)
H4.2 Cat_2 Biotechnology 0.025 -0.133*
(0.742) (0.062)
H4.2 Cat_7 Film, TV and Theatre 0.155 ** 0.041
(0.049) (0.575)
H4.2 Cat_15 Prof. & Business Serv. 0.164 * 0.047
(0.079) (0.204)
H4.3 Stage_1 Growth 0.240 *** 0.073
(0.001) (0.771)
H4.3 Stage_2 Early 0.102 0.023
(0.114) (0.420)
H4.4 Year_ 1 2013 -0.113 0.023
(0.119) (0.788)
H4.4 Year_ 2 2014 -0.015 0.048
(0.867) (0.626)
H4.4 Year_ 3 2015 0.109 0.127
(0.222) (0.154)
H4.4 Year_4 2017 0.114 0.203**
(0.209) (0.020)
R2 0.000 0.049 0.005 0.034 0.206 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.126 0.065 0.060 0.051 0.483
Adjusted R2 -0.005 0.043 -0.001 0.028 0.202 -0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 0.122 -0.036 0.049 0.024 0.346
47 
 
 
When controlling the independent variables one by one, it seems that several hypotheses are 
correct. Duration is significantly negatively related to overfunding while adding a video to the 
campaign, getting conversation to the website via forum posts and obtaining external funding 
are positively associated to overfunding. From different segments, it appears that the Film, TV 
and Theatre, and Professional & Business Services category, are positively related to 
overfunding. Similarly, Growth stage companies are more overfunded than their peers in other 
stages.  
 
However, while controlling all of the independent variables at the same time to overfunding, 
the segmentation hypotheses nor adding a video to the campaign site makes a difference. Only 
three variables lasted both of the models as significant independent variables, in addition to the 
correlation analysis. First, a shorter duration is associated with stronger overfunding (model 2, 
coefficient = -0.220, significant at 1%; model 14, coefficient = -0,176, significant at 5%). 
Second, increased amount of forum posts is associated with overfunding (model 5, coefficient 
= 0.454; model 14, coefficient = 0,541; both significant at 1%). Third, increased amount of 
external transactions is associated with overfunding (model 9, coefficient = 0.355; model 12, 
coefficient = 0.353; both significant at 1%). 
 
The Table 9 also provides us the R-squared values. In general, the higher the R-squared, the 
better the model fits the data. The values are always denoted between 0% and 100%. However, 
the numerical results should be interpreted with caution and jointly with the other model 
statistics. As the study attempts to predict crowd’s behavior, the values of under 50% are 
understandable. Human behavior is harder to predict than the weather for instance. In our 
models, the R-squared always seems to increase with the significantly related independent 
variables, providing us additional conformity. Thus, the first research question can be now 
answered: 
 
RQ1: What are the key drivers of overfunding in online equity crowdfunding? 
 
Looking at the research framework, the results now indicate that there is one aspect in three of 
the higher order hypotheses forms that are related to overfunding. Firstly, when a founder is 
thinking about the general campaign conditions, she should be focusing on the funding 
duration. Shorter funding duration is associated with overfunding. The results are in line with 
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Mollick (2014) who discovered that the projects reaching the funding goal have a shorter 
funding period. However, Koch (2016) reports that in the reward-based crowdfunding 
environment extended funding period of successfully funded campaigns is associated with 
stronger overfunding. The results in our equity-based context conflicts with the finding. The 
difference originates most likely from the dissimilar payoff sharing after a successful campaign: 
in equity crowdfunding, investors receive a prominent part or share of a company against the 
money they have invested when in reward-based crowdfunding, a product or experience is 
exchanged for the obtained funding. 
 
Secondly, of the project information disclosure, company representatives should be focusing 
on reaching a good amount of traffic to their campaign site via forum posts.  The finding is in 
line with Moritz et al. (2015) who outlined that communication activities by peer investors are 
relevant for the investment decision made by the crowd in German equity-based crowdfunding 
market. Moreover, the result supports the conclusion that communication has a positive 
influence on overfunding in reward-based crowdfunding (Koch, 2016). 
 
Thirdly, of the external campaign context, getting a high amount of external investments as a 
percentage of the total funding goal from VCs, angel investors, and family and friends, will 
have a positive influence on overfunding. The result supports the vast amount of literature 
which state that if a project gets funding early on, and seem to reach the funding goal, attract 
even more funding from the crowd (see e.g., Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). Additionally, the 
finding is in line with Virtala, who investigated external investments with a dummy variable. 
 
Fourthly, of the project segmentation category, none of the independent variables had a 
significant effect in all of the models when testing our hypotheses. However, Film, TV and 
Theatre, as well as Professional & Business Services category performed better than their peers 
when testing them individually with the overfunding variable. The same effect happened to 
growth stage companies. On the other hand, biotechnology industry category and year 2017 
were positively associated with overfunding when modelling them together with all of the 
independent variables. Consequently, although we could see some patterns on the industry, 
stage and year segments, the regression analysis does not give a clear picture on the association 
to overfunding. The low amount of data restricts the reliability and coherence of results 
concerning the effects of different categories. 
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Fifthly, in addition to the project segmentation category where none of the variables persisted 
all of our models, it is essential to look at all of the other independent variables that do not 
explain overfunding: funding goal, minimum investment, video, pitch updates, hot market issue 
and December timing. From these independent variables, Koch (2016) discovered that the 
funding goal is negatively related to overfunding, but this research did not find significant 
association in equity-based crowdfunding context. Minimum investment and pitch updates 
were also selected as independent variables from the previous entrepreneurial finance reports, 
but they did not have significant effect on overfunding. Additionally, hot market issue and 
December timing hypotheses were constructed from the preceding IPO and behavioral finance 
literature. In their part, future studies could validate the interesting hypotheses outcomes 
another time with a broader data. 
 
By looking at the results our data provided and the previous research on behavioral heuristics, 
I am now able to derive results to our second qualitative question, which oppose the general 
notion of optimization theory: 
 
RQ2: What are the critical crowd heuristics, which contribute to a campaign to be 
overfunded? 
 
The results indicate that the shorter the campaign duration, the stronger is overfunding. There 
is ample indication in the behavioral literature that humans are impatient by nature which is 
associated with present heuristic for immediate reward (Robson & Samuelsson, 2008). 
Therefore, I argue that campaign duration and the present heuristic for immediate reward are 
bound to each other also when multiple people operate simultaneously in equity crowdfunding 
context. It is harder for the crowd to assess the costs and benefits of a longer-term campaign 
compared to short term success when the reward of the investment is given in a form of equity 
stake. However, the heuristic is not necessarily about the crowd’s failure: as we know, investors 
evaluate the possible downsides and choose issues with a shorter duration to decrease their costs 
of financing (Guo & Brooks, 2009). This relates to time discounting: A bird in the hand is better 
than two in the bush. After the project has successfully reached its target, the crowd may think 
that at least they are able to invest their money to a popular project now, compared to waiting 
uncertainly if some other project will achieve its funding goal. 
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Secondly, the amount of forum posts in the campaign webpage were associated with 
overfunding. I propose that the result is a combination of several different group heuristics. 
Social theory suggests that people might lean on to collective conservatism (Kuran, 1987) and 
forget their own facts of a particular issue if they see several people rejecting their personal 
belief. Once a practice (like a reached funding target in a crowdfunding campaign) has been 
made, it is likely to be continued, even though it would not have any particular foundation for 
it. Moreover, the crowd might give into satisficing (Simon 1978), and not use their individual 
cognitive abilities as it is easier to follow other people than make your own decisions. However, 
satisficing might act here as a positive heuristics: by building up individual decision-making, 
crowdfunding can build better decisions overall allowing for a broader range of expertise. The 
crowd may see the investment worthy enough to deserve more money than requested.  
The association of forum posts with overfunding can be due to vivid language: peer 
communication could reduce perceived information asymmetries of crowd investors (Moritz et 
al., 2015) and make evaluation more accurate providing greater efficiency in crowdfunding 
decisions. Through social forums, individuals can dynamically contribute in the crowdfunding 
process, share visions about new business models and thus enable the power of the crowd 
(Ordanini et al., 2011). The questions in the forum can be quite prompt regarding company’s 
future forecasts, business model and market context2. On the other hand, online commenters 
can be hateful and dampen the spirit of entrepreneurs. In the decade of deliberate 
misinformation spread via online social media, the platform operators and regulators should 
monitor carefully what is posted to the forum. However, the line is thin on which comments 
can be posted and which are erased, as the platform operator could get too much power on 
peoples’ opinions.  
Thirdly, I suggest that the external investments of the campaign funding act as a reference point 
to other crowd investors. Thus, in the equity-based crowdfunding context, they work as anchors 
to investors, as initially proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). Again, early investments 
by experts in the beginning of the campaign channel positive signals to the crowd and encourage 
following funding (Kim & Viswanathan, 2013). The behavior might be interpreted both as 
negative and positive way: Once again, on the negative side, the crowd might disregard their 
own knowledge as someone else interrupts the deciding process although they would have 
significant information on the quality of the project. However, having an expert investing in a 
                                               
2 See Appendix C for an example of forum post and the subsequent answer from the company management 
51 
 
 
project might act as a positive signal of the company’s quality: research from IPOs has reported 
that investments from venture capitalist act as signaling to amateur investors, decreasing the 
amount of under-subscribed IPOs (Barry et al., 1990). The positive action could lead to herding 
behavior where amateur investors follow guidance set by expert investors: initial backing 
relates to subsequent funding from the crowd (Agrawal et al., 2014) ultimately leading to 
overfunding. On the other hand, according to Mollick and Nanda (2015), experts  are  less  
swayed  by  the  salesmanship  of  the campaign  pitch than the crowd, thus focusing more on 
the critical areas which determine the company's success in the future. Thus, experts act as 
gatekeepers, blocking irrational enthusiasm or other collective hazards.  
 
The results mirror the central difficulty of predicting human and group behavior: there may be 
several heuristics that explain the overfunding of individual campaign. What makes it even 
more difficult to interpret is the fact that the crowdfunding mechanism is a complex systems 
which is not predicted solely by individual behavior: parts and the whole differ because what 
matters are the interactions between such parts. However, based on the explorative research 
design, we are able to find a foothold for several possible group heuristics.  Additionally, due 
to the hypotheses construction and the subsequent independent variables that did not have any 
effect on overfunding, some of the heuristics in our bounded rationality framework will be 
rejected. For now, the explorative research design, and subsequent hypotheses building and 
results do not find associations to mental accounting, representativeness heuristic, availability 
bias and status quo bias with overfunding. The future research on crowdfunding and behavioral 
finance is bound to challenge these assumptions. 
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6.6. Ordinal logistic regression 
To validate the results further, I will perform an additional robustness check on the dependent 
variable overfunding in this section. To be precise, ordinal logistic regression will be executed 
and for the analysis, the percentage funding of the campaigns will be divided into four 
categories. The borders of the categories are below 25%, below 100%, below 150% and over 
150% so that the sample size in each group is closely the same:  
 
Table 10: Sample size in the ordinal logistic regression 
       
 
 
I will report a single odds ratio of the independent variables alongside the robust standard errors 
and p-values. The odds ratio is used to indicate the effect each variable has on predicting if the 
campaign will be in the highest category. Thus, a one-unit increase in the independent variable 
will give us the likelihoods of reaching the over 150% percentage category, compared to 
cumulative other lower categories.  
 
Table 11 presents the results of the ordinal logistic regression on the dependent variable 
overfunding. The results are in line with the previous OLS regression model: decreasing 
funding duration, an increased amount of forum posts and external investments are associated 
to the overfunding phenomena. From the results we can interpret that founders' who concentrate 
on these variables are more likely to get their campaign to the highest category of over 150% 
percentage funding raised. 
 
 
 
 
Category N
Marginal 
Precentage
Cumulative 
Percentage
Below 25% 62 33,50 % 33,50 %
Below 100% 42 22,70 % 56,20 %
Below 150% 40 21,60 % 77,80 %
Over 150% 41 22,20 % 100,00 %
Grand Total 185 100,00 % 100,00 %
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Table 11: Ordinal logistic regression 
The table displays the ordinal logistic regression for the dependent variable overfunding. The individual 
independent variables are first controlled to the dependable variable overfunding alone, and afterward they 
are all measured together. The sample ranges from May 2012 to September 2017, covering 185 equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. The table reports the odds ratios, robust standard errors in parenthesis and 
coefficient p-value significance:* p<0.1,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01. From industry variables, only the ones with 
significance in either model or in the previous OLS regression are presented. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions and Appendix B for exact p-value significances.   
 
Forum posts and external investments will have a positive effect on the overfunding, yet again.  
Receiving one additional forum post to the campaign website will increase the likelihood of the 
project to be in the highest category of >150% funding by 1.057 times (p<0.001). Furthermore, 
a one unit increase in external investments (expressed in %) was associated with significantly 
higher odds of being in the highest category. However, a reverse effect happens with the 
campaign duration: An increased duration (expressed in days) was associated with overfunding 
with an odds ratio of 0.987 times, making it 1.3% less likely to reach the highest category. Thus, 
interpreting the ordinal logistic regression results together with the correlation matrix and OLS 
regression, the findings strengthen the assumptions made of the variable associations to 
overfunding as well as the behavioral heuristics related with the phenomena. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Overfunding Variables
H1.1 ln funding goal 1.511 0.166***
(0.275) (0.529)
H1.2 Funding duration 0.987*** 0.989**
(0.004) (0.005)
H1.3 Minimum investment 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
H2.1 Video 3.248 *** 2.241*
(0.178) (0.417)
H2.2 Forum posts 1.057*** 1.069***
(0.010) (0.016)
H2.3 Pitch updates 0.998 0.996
(0.062) (0.078)
H3.1 Hot market Issue 0.901 0.944
(0.272) (0.391)
H3.2 December timing 1.087 1.219
(0.325) (0.390)
H3.3 External investments 5.982*** 7.405***
(0.467) (0.591)
H4.1 B2B vs. B2C 0.811 1.072
(0.269) (0.424)
H4.2 Cat_2 Biotechnology 2.866 0.075
(1.831) (2.105)
H4.2 Cat_7 Film, TV and Theatre 1.715 0.175
(1.299) (1.875)
H4.2 Cat_15 Prof. & Business Serv. 4.909*** 3.997*
(0.603) (1.000)
H4.3 Stage_1 Growth 5.589*** 3.826**
(0.417) (1.000)
H4.3 Stage_2 Early 2.818*** 1.932
(0.375) (0.487)
H4.4 Year_1 2013 0.237*** 0.471
(0.463) (0.792)
H4.4 Year_2 2014 0.600 0.511
(0.422) (0.612)
H4.4 Year_3 2015 1.454 1.489
(0.365) (0.526)
H4.4 Year_ 4 2017 1.272 1.899
(0.403) (0.498)
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7. Conclusion 
The present study concentrates on a research gap suggested by Wallmeroth et al. (2017: 60) in 
the crowdfunding context by focusing on specific phenomenon of overfunding. More precisely, 
it seeks to find answers for two questions: 1) What are the key drivers of overfunding in online 
equity crowdfunding?, and 2) What are the critical crowd heuristics, which contribute to a 
campaign to be overfunded? The report combines both explorative and quantitative research 
design, and has implications for both scholars and practitioners. 
Studying campaign conditions, project information disclosure, external market context and 
project segmentation, the study answers the first research question by demonstrating that 
duration, forum posts and external investments (from venture capitalists, and family and 
friends) are central determinants of overfunding in equity crowdfunding. I find that shorter 
campaign duration is associated with overfunding, which deviate from the earlier overfunding 
study made by Koch (2016) in the reward-based crowdfunding setting. The reward-based and 
equity-based models set apart in several ways, and the divergence is likely due to different 
stakeholders’ preferences and heuristics concerning momentum, engagement, urgency or 
resources. In addition, an increased amount of forum posts is associated with overfunding. The 
finding is in line with previous studies which report that the communication between peer 
investors and other experienced investors influence the decision-making process of individual 
investors (Moritz et al., 2015),  and that communication has a positive influence on overfunding 
in reward-based crowdfunding (Koch, 2016). Furthermore, the external investments as a 
percentage of funding goal is connected with overfunding. The finding is aligned with Virtala 
(2017), who studied external backing with a dummy variable. Lastly, percentage-wise, 
overfunding seems to be a more pronounced phenomenon in equity- than reward-based 
crowdfunding. Additionally, during the past few years, overfunding seems to be more 
noticeable than before, although the findings suffer from the amount of data. 
For the second question, the research builds an overall framework based on Simon’s (1947) 
original bounded rationality theorem, human heuristics proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1974) and recent research made in behavioral finance. The framework is original to the study 
and has been constructed with the crowdfunding phenomena in mind. By looking at peer 
pressure, priming and information effects, the study’s explorative research theory suggests that 
present heuristic, herding behavior, anchoring, collective conservatism, satisficing and 
vividness will affect the overfunding phenomenon. The research does not try to offer definite 
answers but rather present the crowdfunding mechanism as a complex system where several 
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group heuristics are in force. Future research will define whether or not the heuristics act more 
as the power of the crowd or as the group’s failure. 
After answering the research questions, the study can be seen to influence the current academic 
research in four ways. Firstly, the paper takes influence and extends the work of Koch (2016) 
who studied the overfunding phenomena in reward-based crowdfunding setting with data from 
Kickstarter. Studying overfunding in equity-based platform thus adds a new way of looking at 
the whole picture, as the two crowdfunding models differentiate by their structure in several 
vital ways.   
 
Secondly, the study strengthens findings in the equity-based crowdfunding context and 
especially extends the literature made with data from the Finnish based crowdfunding platform 
Invesdor. Virtala (2017) was the first one to touch the issue of overfunding with Invesdor based 
data while concentrating mostly on attention grabbing elements. In addition, Lukkarinen (2016) 
has studied the drivers leading the campaigns to reach their initial funding goal. The report 
reinforces the studies with a different set of variables while presenting a comprehensive 
framework for the overfunding phenomena. Additionally, the research supplements the picture 
of Finnish equity crowdfunding market by introducing a larger sample of data compared to the 
previous studies. 
 
Thirdly, the report is among the first crowdfunding studies, which connects the crowdfunding 
phenomenon with the IPO literature. This is most likely due to the fact the IPO under- or over-
subscription studies relate best to equity-based overfunding, which has been neglected in 
crowdfunding reports so far. Although IPOs arguably differ from equity crowdfunding by the 
legislation and company monitoring, many similarities also exist: non-expert individuals are 
included in both processes, equity is at stake and many similar variables alter the success of the 
campaign. Furthermore, as with crowdfunding, the IPO process involves informational 
asymmetries between sellers of the company and market participants, and expert investors send 
signals to the general public during the campaign. 
Fourthly, the present study closes the gap between crowdfunding literature and the behavioral 
economics studies. Although few articles have studied the decision-making process of amateur 
investors in crowdfunding (see e.g., Marom & Sade, 2013; Moritz et al., 2015; Kim & 
Viswanathan, 2018), the literature surrounding human behavior on this specific entrepreneurial 
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finance subsegment is still scattered. Additionally the behavior of the crowd can be entirely 
different after the project has successfully reached its target. 
 
For practitioners, the research has several implications for all the stakeholders involved. The 
financial world has accustomed itself with the Warren Buffett truism ‘'to make money you must 
first survive''. Also in crowdfunding, companies face the same belief. The entrepreneurs’ 
primary objective at first is to persuade the crowd to invest in their venture to reach the initial 
funding target to get financing. Thus, the initial target is often set very conservatively. However, 
by focusing on the drivers of overfunding, the company could exceed their funding goal and 
accelerate their growth story with more capital. This can be done with closely the same amount 
of effort and resources, just by decreasing the duration of the project for instance. On the other 
hand, for the investors, it is worthy to recognize the various mechanisms affecting the 
investment decision. Although humans are able to analyze complex problems, sometimes our 
mind is not well designed to exercise sound judgment. To avoid cognitive traps, a decent 
understanding of behavioral biases is a good start. 
For the society as a whole, legislators and platform operators, the study could indicate how 
other markets evolve when the regulation changes. Equity-based crowdfunding was opened in 
May 2016 for unaccredited investors in the case of US for instance (Abrams, 2017) when in 
Finland it has been picking up traction from 2012 onwards. Moreover, regulators should take 
into consideration the possible drawbacks of the crowd’s heuristics: some stakeholders could 
use them as their own advantage without thinking the potential harm for the whole community. 
For instance, in the decade of ’fake news’ and online chats, the platform operators and 
regulators should monitor carefully what is posted in the crowdfunding forum so that the 
conversation stays appropriate. 
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8. Limitations and future research 
The research is not without limitations concerning the method and the framework used. Firstly, 
the results are partial to the platform analyzed. The study is only concentrating on one 
crowdfunding platform mostly focusing on Scandinavian countries with their specific cultural 
and socioeconomic heritage. This leads to a question of whether or not the study is generalizable 
to other areas of the world. Furthermore, the European crowdfunding market is still in a 
condition where it is finding its foothold as alternative financing form due to regulatory 
changes. Thus, the stakeholders' behavior may change during the following years as equity 
crowdfunding becomes commonplace. To overcome the limitations, the study could be 
executed in the future with ampler data and possibly in a different cultural context.  
 
Secondly, the results are narrow to the available data. The research includes 185 equity-
crowdfunding campaigns: with broader data, the results could be more precise. For instance, 
the data was apparently not sufficient to prove any meaningful results for the segmentation 
variables (stage category, industry category, yearly fluctuations) and the hot market issue. 
Additionally, the December effect would be interesting to control with a more extensive data or 
with a different manner of approach. The idea for the December effect started with a Facebook 
post where a user commented that all crowdfunding campaigns should be set to start on your 
payday. Mental accounting heuristic did not prove any results this time, but it could show 
something with a different angle or timeframe.   
 
Thirdly, the research could have included many other variables, which may affect overfunding. 
For instance, previous research in entrepreneurial finance has reported that associated social 
media channels (Lukkarinen et al., 2016), business networks (Giudici et al., 2013) and founder's 
background (Moritz et al., 2015) is associated with better buzz around the company. However, 
due to the nature of the report, the study is restricted to the specific amount of different 
variables. Future research could bring necessary enhancements to the shortcoming. 
 
Regarding the second question of the behavioral heuristics leading to overfunding, it is difficult 
from the bounded rationality literature to offer a coherent framework encompassing all human 
heuristics. Some heuristics might also have similar characteristics and could be even mixed up 
together. The economists who support formal mathematical models to study the human 
decision-making phenomena often criticize these drawbacks (see e.g., Gigerenzer 1996). 
58 
 
 
However, others argue that the alternative to precise mathematical models explaining human 
behavior is not chaos. Psychology offers integrative concepts and mid-level generalizations, 
which gain credibility from their ability to explain ostensibly different phenomena in diverse 
domains. (Kahneman, 2003: 1449) In this research, the objective of linking the overfunding 
phenomena with behavioral heuristics was not to offer a bulletproof mathematical solution but 
instead act as a stepping-stone for future research and combine exploratory research design with 
quantitative method. In the future, academic studies could concentrate on making formal 
mathematical and time variant models to study the heuristics leading to overfunding. In 
addition, the mix of questionnaire and platform data could make it possible to see trends that 
last over time. 
 
Lastly, the discussions on human heuristics generating overfunding could be regarded either as 
negative biases or, on the positive side, as the power of the crowd. Thus, it would be fruitful to 
investigate how overfunded projects have succeeded after the financing rounds compared to 
their peers: similar studies have been made in the IPO markets (e.g. Cornelli & Goldreich, 2003; 
Agrawal et al., 2008). This way, a more precise conclusion could be made whether or not the 
excess money received is invested effectively. 
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Appendix B: Regression p-value significance 
  OLS regression Ordinal logistic reg. 
Overfunding Variables   
Regression 
one by one 
Regression 
all together 
Regression 
one by one 
Regression 
all together 
    P-values P-values P-values P-values 
H1.1 ln funding goal   0.842 0,001 0.133 0.001 
H1.2 Funding duration   0.05 0,017 0.002 0.035 
H1.3 Minimum investment   0.362 0,097 0.785 0.358 
H2.1 Video   0.024 0,968 0.000 0.053 
H2.2 Forum posts   0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 
H2.3 Pitch updates   0.856 0,968 0.979 0.958 
H3.1 Hot market Issue   0.586 0,574 0.702 0.944 
H3.2 December timing   0.846 0,427 0.797 0.611 
H3.3 External investments   0.000 0,000 0.000 0.001 
H4.1 B2B vs. B2C   0.306 0,806 0.436 0.870 
H4.2 Cat_1 Art & Design   0.885 0,978 0.678 0.459 
H4.2 Cat_2 Biotechnology   0.742 0,062 0.565 0.218 
H4.2 Cat_3 Consumer Products   0.283 0,115 0.173 0.174 
H4.2 Cat_4 E-Commerce   0.806 0,482 0.688 0.585 
H4.2 Cat_5 Education   0.168 0,401 0.824 0.964 
H4.2 Cat_6 Environmental and Ethical   0.896 0,697 0.811 0.928 
H4.2 Cat_7 Film, TV and Theatre   0.049 0,575 0.678 0.352 
H4.2 Cat_8 Food and Drink   0.644 0,926 0.987 0.891 
H4.2 Cat_9 Health and Fitness   0.464 0,679 0.272 0.898 
H4.2 Cat_10 IT and Telecommunication   0.458 0,640 0.371 0.821 
H4.2 Cat_11 Leisure and Tourism   0.945 0,749 0.824 0.743 
H4.2 Cat_12 Manufacturing   0.985 0,342 0.904 0.338 
H4.2 Cat_13 Media and Creative Services   0.882 0,502 0.525 0.981 
H4.2 Cat_14 Other   0.114 0,695 0.659 0.418 
H4.2 Cat_15 Professional & Business Serv.   0.079 0,204 0.008 0.065 
H4.2 Cat_16 Retail   0.776 0,558 0.239 0.212 
H4.2 Cat_17 Sport and Leisure   0.366 0,803 0.103 0.248 
H4.2 Cat_18 Internet Business   0.462 0,477 0.146 0.152 
H4.3 Stage_1 Growth   0.001 0,771 0.000 0.034 
H4.3 Stage_2 Early   0.114 0,420 0.006 0.176 
H4.4 Year_2013   0.119 0,788 0.002 0.884 
H4.4 Year_2014   0.867 0,626 0.226 0.960 
H4.4 Year_2015   0.222 0,154 0.365 0.448 
H4.4 Year_2017   0.209 0,020 0.551 0.198 
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Appendix C: Example of a forum post 
August 4th, 2018 
 
